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Abstract
I begin with a discussion of two ways of imagining something: ‘from the
inside’ and ‘from the outside’. My interest in this topic is two-fold: First, I
want to see what studying this topic can teach us about the nature of men-
tal content—in particular, about the content of de se and de re thoughts.
Second, I want to formulate an account of this distinction which will help
us understand the role these two types of imagining play in philosophical
thought experiments about personal identity over time. The first three
chapters of this dissertation focus on the first set of issues, issues of imag-
ination and content. Chapter 4 extends and applies some of these insights
to a puzzle about personal identity over time.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert C. Stalnaker
Title: Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy
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Chapter 1
Imagination and the De Se
Consider the difference between imagining skiing down a steep hill and
imagining that you are skiing down the same hill. In the first case, you
imagine what it would be like to actually be there, on the hill. The imagi-
native scenario is viewed through your imaginary ski goggles, and includes
a view of the tips of your skis and the white snow before yourself; it may be
accompanied by imagining being cold and full of adrenaline. In the other
case, you take a god’s-eye view on the scenario and ‘see’ yourself zooming
down the hill, as if you were watching a film of yourself skiing.
The first type of imagining is ‘from the inside’ or from the first-person
point of view. The second type of imagining is ‘from the outside’ or from the
third-person point of view.1 In the above paragraph, we used two heuris-
tics for explaining the distinction: a linguistic characterization, between
imagining doing or being or experiencing something versus imagining that
something is the case; and a distinction between the characteristic visual
imagery associated with each type of imagining.
Thinking about visual imagery makes the distinction vivid, but it is
potentially misleading. The distinction is not merely a distinction between
two kinds of perceptual imagery. I can imagine from the inside being
Napoleon, sitting in a pitch-black and completely quiet room, and I can do
this by visualizing a featureless black expanse; I can also imagine that the
universe contains nothing by visualizing a featureless black expanse. The
former imagining is from the inside, the latter is not. I can also imagine
a scenario from a particular visual point of view, without imagining being
1The inside-outside distinction (or something like it) appears, in different guises, in
many places in the literature. See, e.g, Williams (1966), Nagel (1974, n.11), Peacocke
(1985), Walton (1990, 28-35), Shoemaker (1994), Velleman (1996), Hill (1997), Martin
(2002) , Higginbotham (2003), and Recanati (2007a,b).
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the individual at that point of view. For example, I can imagine the visual
experience of someone skiing down a hill, without imagining actually being
the one doing the skiing, controlling the movements of the skier’s body.2
An imagining from the inside may exploit both types of imagery. For ex-
ample, I may imagine being a race-car driver in the following way (Williams,
1966, 38): I imagine feeling tense, my body jolted around, hands clasped
tightly around the steering wheel; then I picture a car – my car – zooming
across the finish line; and then my garlanded neck and beaming face on the
front of F1 Racing (world’s best-selling grand prix magazine). It is natural
to describe my entire imaginative episode as “imagining from the inside
being a race-car driver” even though not all of the associated imagery is
from the driver’s visual point of view.
There is a larger question looming the in background: what is the re-
lationship between imagery and imagination? We won’t have much to say
about this, but the two previous paragraphs indicate some of the subtleties
involved. We can, I think, begin the search for a more precise characteriza-
tion of the inside-outside distinction, even if a number of questions about
its precise nature are left open for the moment.
1.1 Inside-outside as centered-uncentered
Focus on imagining from the outside. Pretend for a moment that I have
super-powers of imagining, and that I can imagine a scenario in maximally
specific detail—that is, suppose I can imagine a whole world, fixing every
last detail of the imagined world. Suppose I imagine from the outside
a situation in which the New England Patriots win the Super Bowl over
the New York Giants, and I imaginatively fix every possible detail of this
situation. How could we characterize the content of this imagining?
The content of my imagining specifies in complete detail a certain pos-
sible situation, a way things could be. It is natural, then, to represent the
content of my imagining by a certain possible world: the possible world
which is exactly as my imagining specifies the world to be (there is only
one, since my imagining is maximally specific). Call that world ‘w’: w
represents the content of my imagining from the outside that the Patriots
win the Super Bowl.
2Thanks to Steve Yablo for pointing this out to me. Sometimes I will talk about
‘imagining such-and-such from x’s point of view’. But this should not be taken simply
to mean ‘imagining things from x’s visual perspective’; it should be taken to mean
‘imagining being x’. I think this is acceptable usage.
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Continue to pretend I have super-powers of imagining. Suppose now I
undertake a different imaginative task: I imagine exactly the same scenario
described above – the very same game, the very same world – but I imagine
that scenario from the point of view of one of its participants. I imagine
being Tom Brady, the quarterback of the New England Patriots, in the
scenario described above. I imagine completing touchdown passes, leaving
the field with victory in hand, falling into the arms of my super-model
girlfriend.
How could we represent the content of this imagining? Here’s an idea:
represent the content as the pair consisting of the possible world w and
Tom Brady, i.e. 〈w, Tom Brady〉. That w is the first member of the pair
represents the fact that the objective scenario I’m imagining corresponds
to the possible world w, and so is the very same objective scenario I earlier
imagined from the outside. That Tom Brady is the second member of the
pair represents the fact that I am looking at w from Brady’s point of view:
I am imagining being Tom Brady in that objective scenario.
Note that I could imagine the very same scenario from another point
of view: I could imagine being Eli Manning, the quarterback for the New
York Giants. I imagine being sacked by the Patriots’ front line, losing the
game, and then being pilloried in the New York Post. The content of this
imagining could be represented as 〈w, Eli Manning〉, representing the fact
that I am again imagining the very same objective scenario (w) as I did
in the two imaginings described above, but this time I am viewing things
from Manning’s point of view.
So this account enables us to represent the fact that in all three cases
I imagine the same objective scenario: in the first case, the content of
the imagining is simply the possible world w, reflecting the fact that I’m
imagining that scenario from the outside and so from no one’s point of
view; in the second case, the content of my imagining is 〈w, Tom Brady〉
representing the fact that I’m viewing the scenario from Brady’s point of
view; in the third case, the content is 〈w, Eli Manning〉, representing the
fact that I’m viewing the scenario from Manning’s point of view.
A note on terminology: a pair consisting of a possible world w and an
inhabitant x of that world is called a centered world : x is said to be the
center, and 〈w, x〉 is centered on x.3
Of course, I do not have super-powers of imagining and cannot imagine
3Often, a centered world is take to be a world-time-individual triple. I will for the
most part ignore this extra complexity since I will not be talking about the temporal
properties of attitudes. The centered worlds terminology is due to Quine (1969).
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things in maximally specific detail. Instead of representing the content
of an imagining from the outside with a single possible world, we can
represent it by a set of possible worlds. When I imagine from the outside
that the Patriots win the Super Bowl, the content of my imagining is
the set of possible worlds in which the Patriots win the the Super Bowl.
My imagining is unspecific on ever so many details. For example, I do
not imaginatively ‘settle’ whether the game is played on a Friday or on a
Sunday. If p is the set of possible worlds compatible with what I imagine,
then in some possible world w in p, the game is played on a Friday, and in
some possible world w′ in p, it is played on a Sunday. Call a set of possible
worlds an uncentered content, or an uncentered proposition, or a possible
worlds proposition.
Similarly, we can represent the content of an imagining from the inside
as a set of centered worlds. I may imagine being one of the fans, watching
the game from the stands. My imagining doesn’t settle whether I am
imagining being forty years old or fifty years old. If p is the set of centered
worlds compatible with what I imagine, then some of the centered worlds
〈w, x〉 in p are such that x is forty years old in w, others 〈w′, x′〉 are such
that x′ is fifty years old in w′. Call a set of centered worlds a centered
content, or a centered proposition.
Note that often when we talk about the content of an imagining, we
are speaking somewhat loosely. If I imagine from the outside that the
Patriots win the Super Bowl, my imagining will likely be somewhat richer
than what is captured by the set of possible worlds in which the Patriots
win the Super Bowl. My imagining may be somewhat committal on, for
example, what the weather is like, whether the players are wearing helmets,
whether there are more than one hundred people at the game, and so on.
Often when we say that the content of my imagining is the proposition p, we
merely mean that the strongest proposition I imagine entails (is included
in) p. Strictly speaking, we should identify the content of my imagining
with the strongest proposition I imagine, i.e. the set of possible or centered
worlds compatible with what I imagine. But where no harm will be done
by speaking loosely, I will continue to do so.
We can state our account of the inside-outside imagination distinction
as follows:
Uncentered Imagination
The content of an imagining from the outside is a set of possible
worlds.
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For all imaginings I, I is an imagining from the outside iff I’s content
is a set of possible worlds.
Centered Imagination
The content of an imagining from the inside is a set of centered
worlds.
For all imaginings I, I is an imagining from the inside iff I’s content
is a set of centered worlds.
There are, of course, well known problems for coarse-grained views
of content, i.e views which take mental contents to be sets of possible
situations. The following are both consequences of our account:
• Whenever I imagine anything, I imagine everything that is necessarily
true.
• Whenever I imagine p, I imagine everything that follows from p.
These are problems for both Uncentered Imagination and Centered Imagi-
nation. These problems, in their full generality, will not be the focus of
this dissertation. However, we will be looking at certain more specific ver-
sions of these problems, and we will refine our account accordingly. These
refinements which will help solve at least some of the problems that face
coarse-grained accounts of content. These matters will be discussed in due
course (see Chapters 2 and 3).4
1.2 A linguistic argument
It is not surprising that a natural and intuitive account of the inside-
outside distinction identifies it with the centered-uncentered distinction.
Lewis (1979) uses centered worlds to give an account of the distinction
4In a sense, in moving from possible worlds to centered worlds, we are already begin-
ning to chip away at these problems. For example, the set of possible worlds in which
I am hungry is the set of possible worlds in which Dilip is hungry. So, on the possible
worlds theory, if I believe that I am hungry, I must believe that Dilip is hungry (and
vice versa), which seems wrong: if I’m a hungry amnesiac, I might believe the former
without believing the latter. This problem seems to be an instance of the second problem
mentioned above. Taking contents to be sets of centered worlds helps solve this partic-
ular instance of that problem, because the set of centered worlds in which the center is
hungry is distinct from (and doesn’t entail) the set of centered worlds in which Dilip is
hungry. So I can believe one without believing the other.
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between de se and de dicto attitudes. Since the inside-outside distinction
is a first-person/third-person distinction, it is natural to think it has some
connection to the de se-de dicto distinction. In this section, I want to show
that we can a give a more powerful argument for our account of the inside-
outside distinction by exploiting this connection. I will introduce Lewis’s
account of the de se-de dicto distinction, motivate a semantic theory of
attitude ascription based on Lewis’s account, and then show how that se-
mantic theory yields an argument that supports Centered and Uncentered
Imagination.
1.2.1 De se and de dicto
The de se-de dicto distinction is made vivid by one of Lewis’s examples:
Consider the case of the two gods. They inhabit a certain pos-
sible world, and they know exactly which world it is. There-
fore, they know every proposition that is true at their world.
Insofar as knowledge is a propositional attitude, they are om-
niscient. Still I can imagine them to suffer ignorance: neither
knows which of the two he is. They are not exactly alike. One
lives on top of the tallest mountain and throws down manna;
the other lives on top of the coldest mountain and throws down
thunderbolts. Neither one knows whether he lives on the tallest
mountain or on the coldest mountain; nor whether he throws
manna or thunderbolts. (Lewis, 1979, 139)
De dicto knowledge is knowledge about the way the world is. The gods have
all the de dicto knowledge there is to have. De se knowledge is knowledge
about who one is. Neither god has all the de se knowledge he could have,
since neither god knows who he is.
Lewis starts from the idea that the content of an epistemic state is
a set of possible worlds. To know a possible worlds proposition p is for
every possible world compatible with what one knows to be contained in
p. Manna and Thunder (as we shall call them) know which world they
inhabit; for every possible worlds proposition p, Manna and Thunder know
whether their world is in p or not. Still, both suffer ignorance, since neither
knows who he is.
In order to model Manna and Thunder’s ignorance, Lewis encourages
us to re-think the nature of an agent’s epistemic alternatives when it comes
to de se knowledge and ignorance. Rather than taking them to be possible
14
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worlds, Lewis suggests that we take them to be centered worlds instead.
A centered world 〈w′, x′〉 is compatible with what an agent x knows just
in case, for all x can tell, she might be x′ in w′. An agent x knows (de se)
that she is F just in case every 〈w′, x′〉 compatible with what she knows
is such that x′ is F in w′. To know a centered proposition (set of centered
worlds) p is for every centered world compatible with what one knows to
be contained in p.
The situation of the two gods can now be thought of as follows: Suppose
the gods live in world β. Since they know every true proposition, β is the
only possible world compatible with what they know. But since neither
god knows who he is, there are two centered worlds compatible with what
each knows, namely 〈β, Manna〉 and 〈β, Thunder〉. Since neither god
knows whether he is Manna or Thunder, both of those centered worlds are
compatible with what each god knows.
Our characterization of Lewis’s theory actually differs slightly from
Lewis’s own. A central theme of Lewis (1979) is that we can use sets
of centered worlds to do all the work sets of possible worlds can do and
more (though Lewis (1994, 320) refers to this as a “cheap trick”). Any
content that could be characterized as a set of possible worlds {w : φ(w)}
could instead be characterized as the set of centered worlds {〈w, x〉 : φ(w)}.
The distinction between de se and de dicto contents can then be made in
terms of types of sets of centered worlds. Following (Egan, 2006, 107), we
can say that a de dicto content is a boring set of centered worlds, where
a set of centered worlds p is boring just in case for all possible worlds w,
and individuals x and y in w, 〈w, x〉 ∈ p iff 〈w, y〉 ∈ p. A boring centered
proposition doesn’t distinguish between world-mates, and so there is a 1-1
correspondence between possible worlds propositions and boring centered
propositions. A centered proposition is interesting iff it is not boring. A
de se content is an interesting centered proposition.
In terms of this terminology, we could formulate our account of the
inside-outside distinction as follows:
Uncentered Imagination (boring)
The content of an imagining from the outside is a boring set of cen-
tered worlds.
For all imaginings I, I is an imagining from the outside iff I’s content
is a boring set of centered worlds.
Centered Imagination (interesting)
The content of an imagining from the inside is an interesting set of
15
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centered worlds.
For all imaginings I, I is an imagining from the inside iff I’s content
is an interesting set of centered worlds.
I don’t think a lot hangs on the difference between thinking of de dicto
contents as boring centered propositions or thinking of them as possible
worlds propositions. I will use both at different points in this dissertation,
depending on which approach best suits my purposes.5
1.2.2 De se attitude reports
Lewis’s account of de se attitudes serves as the basis for an attractive
account of de se ascription. Consider the following case:6
Bleeding John
John is looking at himself in the mirror, but he doesn’t realize
that it is he who he sees. The arm of the man in the mirror
is bleeding, i.e. John’s arm is bleeding. Knowing that those
around him are a helpful sort, John thinks to himself, That
guy will receive help. But not believing that his own arm is
bleeding, John doesn’t believe that he himself will receive help,
i.e. he doesn’t think to himself, I will receive help.
And consider the following two sentences:
(1) a. John expects to receive help.
b. John expects that he will receive help.
The data, first observed by Morgan (1970), is that (1a) is unambiguously
false in this situation, whereas (1b) has at least one reading on which it
is true. Note that John lacks the de se expectation that he himself will
receive help, but that he has a de dicto (or de re) expectation that the
person who is in fact identical to him will receive help. This suggests that
5One reason for preferring the centered worlds vs. possible worlds characterization
of the de se-de dicto distinction is that the attempt to characterize all contents using
only centered worlds has been challenged recently by Nolan (2006), who points out that
Lewis’s official account is incompatible with the existence of certain de se desires (e.g.
the wish that one had never existed). I suspect that Lewis’s account can be defended
from Nolan’s objection, but I won’t pursue this further.
6This is a modified version of a case in von Fintel (2005).
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(1a) can only be read as reporting a de se expectation, whereas (1b) can
be read as reporting either a de se or a de dicto expectation (the latter
giving us a reading that is true in this situation).
According to a standard syntactic theory, the subject of (1a)’s lower
clause is PRO, a phonologically null pronoun that is controlled by the
subject of the higher clause.7 So the real structure of (1a) is:
John expects (PRO) to receive help.
So our observation about the Bleeding John case can be put by saying that
PRO gives rise to unambiguously de se readings.
Why does subject-control PRO give rise to unambiguously de se read-
ings? The analysis of attitude verbs and PRO that we adopt is inspired by
Chierchia (1989) and von Stechow (2002, 2003).8 This is couched in a more
general framework of type-theoretic intensional semantics, similar to the
system in von Fintel and Heim (2004). In this framework, semantic values
are given relative to a context c, an index i, and a contextually-determined
variable assignment g. A context is a triple 〈wc, tc, xc〉 where xc is the
speaker at time tc in possible world wc. An index is just a possible world
wi (for the sake of ease, we ignore the temporal features of the sentences
in question).
The general idea of our semantics is that the complement clause of an
attitude verb can express either a possible worlds proposition or a cen-
tered proposition.9 Centered propositions are generated when an object-
language λ-binder occurs inside the scope of the attitude verb and binds
an element in its complement clause. Such a λ-binder may bind overt pro-
nouns, but we also assume it can bind PRO. Indeed, we assume that PRO
is obligatorily bound by a λ-binder that occurs in the scope of the nearest
attitude verb.10
7Not every gerundive phrase has PRO as subject; but standard diagnostics (e.g. idiom
and dummy-it tests) reveal that imagines is a subject-control, rather than a raising, verb.
8For a related, but slightly different, take on these issues, see Anand and Nevins
(2004), von Fintel (2005), and Anand (2006).
9Note that this does not necessarily mean that attitude verbs are ambiguous. For
example, JSam believesKc,i,g might denote a function whose domain is the union of the
set of possible worlds propositions and the set of centered propositions. (The double
brackets “J K” denote a four-place interpretation function that takes expression-context-
index-assignment quadruples to truth values.)
10This assumption can be spelled out in the compositional semantics by specifying the
right phi-features for PRO ; see von Stechow (2002, 2003) for details. For background on
the relevant system of variable binding, see Heim and Kratzer (1998).
17
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With these assumptions in place, we have the following semantic value
(intension) for PRO to receive help:
λw.Jλ1 PRO1 to receive helpKc,w,g
= λw.λx.JPRO1 to receive helpKc,w,gx/1
= λw.λx. x receives help in w.
Note that this is (equivalent to) a centered proposition.11 We assume the
attitude verb expects shifts the index, so that we get the following truth
condition for (1a):
JJohn expects λ1 PRO1 to receive helpKc,wi,g = 1 iff all the 〈w, x〉
compatible with what John expects in wi are such that x receives
help in w.
So (1a) comes out false in Bleeding John, because it is not true in all the
〈w, x〉 compatible with what John expects that x receives help in w, since
John lacks the relevant de se expectation.
The complement of expects on the intended reading of (1b), however,
is a possible worlds proposition:
λw.Jhe1 will receive helpKc,w,g
= λw. g(he1) receives help in w.
Note that no object language λ-binder occurs in the structure, and so he1
is free; we assume the variable assignment g assigns John to he1. So (1b)
will be true just in case John stands in the relation of expectation to the set
of possible worlds in which John receives help. This gives us the following
truth-condition for (1b):
JJohn expects that he1 will receive helpKc,wi,g = 1 iff all the w
compatible with what John expects in wi are such that John
receives help in w.
The reason (1b) comes out true in Bleeding John is that, on the relevant
reading, that sentence is true just in case in all the w compatible with what
John expects, John receives help in w. Since John does expect that the
11Sometimes we characterize contents as sets of possible or centered worlds, sometimes
as the characteristic function of such sets. The formulations are essentially equivalent,
and we use both.
18
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person who is in fact identical to John will receive help, (1b) is true. Thus,
this semantic theory gets the desired result: (1b) has a true reading in this
scenario, while (1a) does not.
I said that (1b) also has a reading on which it reports a de se expec-
tation. Unlike (1a), (1b) has two readings. How is this predicted by our
semantics? Assume that overt pronouns can, in certain circumstances, be
bound by an object language λ-binder that occurs within the scope of the
nearest attitude verb.12 This means that there are two possible LFs for
(1b):
• John expects that λ1 he1 will receive help. (de se)
• John expects that he1 will receive help. (de dicto)
The de se reading of (1b) will be generated when a λ-binder is present,
since the intension of λ1 he1 will receive help is a centered proposition.
The de dicto reading will be generated when no such λ-binder is present,
since, as we saw above, the intension of he1 will receive help is a possible
worlds proposition.
1.2.3 Imagination reports
We now have an an account of PRO and attitude reports which has been
motivated independently of any claims about the meaning of imagination
reports, and we can now apply this account to the case of imagination.
I begin with an argument for Centered Imagination. When I introduced
the inside-outside distinction I mentioned that it seems to correspond to
a linguistic distinction. And often when philosophers write about the dis-
tinction between imagining from the inside and imagining from the out-
side, they emphasize that it is the distinction between imagining doing or
experiencing something vs. imagining that one is doing or experiencing
something. For example, consider this passage from Walton (1990, 29):
12The ‘in certain circumstances’ qualification is important. For consider sentence (a):
(a) I expect that he will receive help.
Obviously this cannot be used to report a de se expectation. The constraint appears to
be morphological: a pronoun can only be read de se if its phi-features agree with the
phi-features of the subject of the attitude verb (e.g. John expects that he will receive
help has a de se reading because the matrix subject and the subject of the complement
clause exhibit phi-featural agreement). For discussion of this, see von Stechow (2002,
2003) and Schlenker (2003).
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Imagining from the inside is... a form of self-imagining charac-
teristically described as imagining doing or experiencing some-
thing (or being a certain way), as opposed to merely imagining
that one does or experiences something or possesses a certain
property.
This suggests that the standard way to report episodes of imagining from
the inside is to use sentences like (2a), and that in order to report an
episode of imagining from the outside one must use something like (2b):
(2) a. Bernie imagined skiing down a steep hill.
b. Bernie imagined that he was skiing down a steep hill.
Now according to the syntactic theory we are relying on, the real structure
of (2a) also has PRO as the subject of the lower clause:
Bernie imagined (PRO) skiing down a steep hill.
The semantics we developed above entails that the semantic value (inten-
sion) of PRO skiing down the hill is the following object:
λw.Jλ1 PRO1 skiing down a steep hillKc,w,g
= λw.λx.JPRO1 skiing down a steep hillKc,w,gx/1
= λw.λx. x is skiing down a steep hill in w.
This is (equivalent to) a centered proposition. So (2a) is true iff Bernie
imagines the centered proposition {〈w, x〉 : x is skiing down a steep hill
in w}. And, as Walton observed, Bernie imagines from the inside skiing
down a steep hill iff (2a) is true. So it follows that Bernie imagines from the
inside skiing down a steep hill iff Bernie imagines the centered proposition
{〈w, x〉 : x is skiing down a steep hill in w}, which is an instance of Centered
Imagination. Since there’s nothing special about this particular case, we
assume the point generalizes.
That’s the argument for Centered Imagination. Now I’ll argue for Un-
centered Imagination by showing that, together with Centered Imagination
and our semantic theory, it helps explain some facts about sentences like
(2b):
(2b) Bernie imagined that he was skiing down a steep hill.
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We noted above that sentences like (2b) can be used to report outside
imaginings. But note they can also be used to report inside imaginings;
they have two readings. This seems to parallel the fact that (1b) has both
a de dicto and a de se reading. If we assume our account of the inside-
outside distinction, and assume the semantic theory sketched above, we
can explain why (2b) has these two readings.
Our semantic theory entails that there are two LFs for (2b) (recall our
discussion of (1b)):
• Bernie imagined that λ1 he1 was skiing down a steep hill.
• Bernie imagined that he1 was skiing down a steep hill.
In the first LF, the overt pronoun he1 is bound by a λ-binder occurring
in the scope of the attitude verb. Thus, the intension of the complement
clause of that LF is a centered proposition. If Centered Imagination is true,
then we predict that (2b) can be read as reporting an inside imagining.
On the second LF, the overt pronoun he1 is free and no λ-binder occurs
within the scope of the attitude verb. Thus, the intension of the com-
plement clause of that LF is a possible worlds proposition. If Uncentered
Imagination is true, then we predict that (2b) can be read as reporting an
outside imagining. Thus, the combination of Centered Imagination, Uncen-
tered Imagination, and our semantic theory explains why (2b) has both an
outside and an inside reading.
Before moving on, I should mention that, on the proposed semantics,
the first-person singular pronoun I is treated as just another pronoun,
albeit with a distinctive presuppositional meaning. The lexical entry for I
is:
JI1Kc,i,g : g(I1) = xc. g(I1)
This says that the semantic interpretation function is partial; it is not
defined if g(I1) 6= xc. Where defined it maps I1 to g(I1). (Note the slight
difference from the standard Kaplanian entry: JIKc,i,g = xc.)
Like any other pronoun, I gets its value from the variable assignment;
however, it presupposes that its referent is the speaker of the context. But
the important thing is that this allows I to be bound, so that a sentence
like (3) can be used to report an inside imagining:
(3) I’m imagining that I’m skiing down a steep hill.
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The inside reading results when I is bound; the outside reading results
when I is free. In what follows, I will occasionally appeal to this idea.13
That completes our case for Centered and Uncentered Imagination. Al-
though I will spend the rest of this chapter looking at a problem for this
account, I think this account is adequate for many purposes. Indeed the
issues discussed in the rest of Chapters 1, 2, and 3 may not be relevant for
certain philosophical uses one might make of this account. For that rea-
son, when I come to discuss the role these two forms of imagining play in
discussions of personal identity, I will use the account of the inside-outside
distinction developed above.
1.3 The problem of the ‘impersonal-de se’
In spite of this linguistic argument in favor of our account of the inside-
outside distinction, there is a potential problem for it. The problem is that
there seem to be cases of imagining from the outside that are also, in some
sense, de se.14
Consider John Perry’s character, Rudolph Lingens (Perry, 1977, 21-22).
Lingens is an amnesiac, who, in some intuitive sense, ‘doesn’t know who he
is’. He is lost in the Stanford Library, and, we shall suppose, has stumbled
upon a book entitled “The Life of Rudolph Lingens”. As Lingens reads
the book, he learns more and more facts about Rudolph Lingens. But he’s
still in the dark about who he himself is—he doesn’t realize that he is the
man he is reading about. Let us suppose that Lingens puts the book down
momentarily and begins to daydream.
We can distinguish two possible imaginings Lingens might have:
Situation 1
Lingens imagines from the outside that he himself is skiing down
a steep hill. Someone asks him what he’s doing and he replies,
13Again, binding can only take place in the appropriate linguistic context; see footnote
12. That the first person singular pronoun can be bound is supported by examples like
(a):
(a) Only I did my homework.
On one reading of (a) it says that for all x, if x is not the speaker, then x didn’t do x’s
homework. It’s difficult to see how to generate this reading if my is not bound by only
I. (This example is attributed to Irene Heim in Schlenker (2004)).
14Thanks to Sarah Moss and Bob Stalnaker for pressing me to consider this problem.
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(3) I’m imagining that I’m skiing down a steep hill.
Situation 2
Lingens imagines from the outside that the person he was just
reading about, namely Rudolph Lingens, is skiing down a steep
hill. Someone asks him what he’s doing and he replies,
(4) I’m imagining that Rudolph Lingens is skiing down a steep
hill.
Lingens doesn’t know who he is. In his imagining in Situation 1, Lingens
‘sees’ someone skiing down a steep hill, and he stipulates that that skier
is him (“Look at me go!” says Lingens). Intuitively, then, there is a dif-
ference between the content of the imaginings in Situations 1 and 2. And,
moreover, it would seem that the imagining in Situation 2 is a de dicto
imagining, whereas the imagining in Situation 1 is, in some sense, de se.
But, importantly, both imaginings are from the outside.
If the imagining in Situation 1 is from the outside, then Uncentered
Imagination tells us its content is a set of possible worlds. Which set?
Presumably, the set of possible worlds in which Lingens is skiing down the
hill. But then the imagining in Situation 1 has the same content as the
imagining in Situation 2, which seems wrong.
If the imagining in Situation 1 is a de se imagining, then presumably
it has a centered content (given that we’ve adopted Lewis’s theory of the
de se). But then Centered Imagination tells us that it is an imagining from
the inside, which it is not. So the example causes trouble for both clauses
of our theory of imagining.
I think the most natural response to the example is to give up the claim
that only inside imaginings have centered contents. The idea would be that
there are simply two kinds of de se imagining, inside imagining and what
we might call impersonal-de se imagining. Lingens’s imagining in Situation
1 is an example of the impersonal-de se.15
If impersonal-de se imaginings have centered contents, then presumably
what Lingens imagines in Situation 1 is the set of centered worlds in which
15It might be more natural to call this second kind of imagining ‘de se imagining from
the outside’, but I don’t want to do this because, as we will see in a moment, an imagining
can be both from the inside and impersonal-de se. I want to avoid the terminological
confusion that would result if we said that an imagining could be both from the inside
and from the outside.
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the center is skiing down a steep hill. If we adopted this view, we could still
maintain that every imagining from the inside has a centered content. The
revision would be to add to that that some imaginings from the outside –
namely impersonal-de se imaginings – also have centered contents. Other
outside imaginings would have uncentered contents. Here’s the idea:
Alternative View
(a) If x imagines that he is F from the inside, then all the
〈w′, x′〉 compatible with what he imagines are such that x′
is F in w′.
(b) If x imagines ‘impersonally-de se’ that he is F , then all the
〈w′, x′〉 compatible with what he imagines are such that x′
is F in w′.
(c) If x imagines something from the outside, and does not
imagine something in the ‘impersonal-de se’ way, then the
content of x’s imagining is a set of possible worlds.
Now if we accept the Alternative View, the inside-outside distinction cross-
cuts that de se-de dicto distinction, and we simply need to find another way
to characterize the inside-outside distinction. The Alternative View isn’t an
account of this inside-outside distinction, but rather a claim about how the
two distinctions are related. Although the Alternative View doesn’t give us
an account of the inside-outside distinction, you might think it at least has
the virtue of adequately characterizing the content of Lingens’s imagining
in Situation 1, something Uncentered and Centered Imagination do not do.
But there is another type of case that the Alternative View cannot handle.
The main problem for the Alternative View is that an imagining can be
both from the inside and impersonal-de se. This is seen most vividly when
you combine Lingens-style ignorance cases with the Lakoff phenomenon.
The Lakoff phenomenon is illustrated by these sentences (both inspired by
Lakoff (1972)):
(5) a. I imagined that I was Brigitte Bardot and that I kissed me.
b. I imagined that I was Jesus and that I forgave me all my sins.16
It seems relatively clear what (5a) is saying: I imagine from the inside being
Bardot, and I imagine kissing the person who is in fact me. (Sentence (5a)
16The original sentence in Lakoff (1972) is I dreamt that I was Brigitte Bardot and that
I kissed me. The ‘dream’ version of (5b) appears in Heim (1994b).
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may also have a reading on which it says that I’m imagining being Bardot
and engaging in an act of self-kissing, but if it does, I wish to ignore that
reading. The reading we’re interested in is one in which the kisser and the
‘kissee’ are distinct.)
To see the problem this creates for the Alternative View, consider Situ-
ation 3:
Situation 3
Lingens imagines that he is Brigitte Bardot and that he is kiss-
ing the person who he in fact is. That is, someone asks him
what he’s doing and he replies by uttering the Lakoff sentence:
(5a) I’m imagining that I am Brigitte Bardot and that I am
kissing me.
Now I take it that the way Lingens imagines himself-qua-kissee in Situation
3 has something important in common with the way he imagines himself
in Situation 1, when he imagines from the outside that he is skiing down
a steep hill. In both cases, he ‘sees’ someone from an external point of
view, someone he identifies as himself. When he imagines himself this
way – whether the imagining is from the inside or from the outside – his
imagining is impersonal-de se. So both inside and outside imaginings can
be impersonal-de se.
The Alternative View runs into trouble with the imagining in Situation
3. To see the problem, first note that, in Situation 3, Lingens is imagining
from the inside being Bardot and kissing exactly one person. Given clause
(a) of the Alternative View, it follows that:
all the 〈w, x〉 compatible with what Lingens imagines are such
that x is Brigitte Bardot in w and x is kissing exactly one person
in w.
But Lingens is also imagining, in the impersonal-de se way, that he is being
kissed by Bardot. Given clause (b) of the Alternative View, it follows that:
all the 〈w, x〉 compatible with what Lingens imagines are such
that x is being kissed by Brigitte Bardot in w.
From those two claims it follows that:
all the 〈w, x〉 compatible with what Lingens imagines are such
that x is Brigitte Bardot in w and x is kissing x in w.
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Thus, the imagining is predicted to be one in which Lingens is imagining
being Bardot engaged in act of self-kissing. But this is not what Lingens
is imagining, and so the Alternative View gets the content of his imagining
wrong.
We can construct a single case that is problematic for both our initial
view (Centered and Uncentered Imagination) and the Alternative View:
Situation 4
Amnesiac Lingens takes himself to be a gentle soul. After read-
ing of some of Rudolph Lingens’s exploits, he comes to believe
that this Rudolph Lingens fellow is a vicious character. He con-
cludes that he is not Rudolph Lingens. He begins to wonder
what it would be like to meet the terrible Lingens. He wor-
ries that Lingens might attack him if they were to meet, and
he imagines this meeting. And in an effort to understand the
mindset of Rudolph Lingens, he imagines the attack from Lin-
gens’s point of view. He might report his imagining by saying:
(6) I imagined that I was Rudolph Lingens and that I attacked
me.
Neither our initial theory nor the Alternative View correctly characterizes
the content of this imagining. We can put the problem in linguistic terms.
There are only two possibilities for the semantic value of me in (6): either
it refers to the speaker (Lingens), or it marks the center (i.e. it is bound
by a quantifier over centered worlds). If our original view was right, it
would refer to Lingens. If the Alternative View was right, it would mark
the center. But in this particular case, the difference between these views
collapses, since the center is Lingens. Thus both of these views entail that
the imagining will have the following as its content:
{〈w, x〉 : x is Rudolph Lingens and x attacks x in w}
But this is not what Lingens is imagining: in his imaginative scenario, the
attacker is distinct from the one attacked. So neither view is adequate.
1.4 Towards a solution
When you combine the Lakoff-phenomenon with the amnesiac-type cases,
it begins to seem that, in the case of attitudes like imagining, there are
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two different ‘self-concepts’ in play. Let me try to give an intuitive (and
somewhat metaphorical) description of what’s happening in that sort of
case. Suppose I were an amnesiac like Lingens. From my point of view,
when I engage in a Lakoff-style imagining, my imaginary scenario contains
two ‘selves’: there is my counterfactual-self, or the individual I am imagin-
ing being, and there is my belief-self, or the individual I believe myself to
be. In Lakoff cases, these two selves come apart. In the Bardot-case, for
example, my counterfactual self is Bardot, and my belief-self is the kissee.
Note that, in this sense, the belief-self need not be identical to Dilip, since
I may not know who I am, and may even have false beliefs about who I
am.
One way to try to handle this sort of case would be to represent each of
these ‘selves’ or ‘self-concepts’ with a different ‘center’: rather than char-
acterizing imagination-alternatives as centered worlds, perhaps we should
represent them with doubly-centered worlds 〈w, x1, x2〉, with x1 keyed to
my counterfactual-self, and x2 keyed to my belief-self.17
The idea would be that Lingens’s imagining in Situation 3 could be
represented as follows:
{〈w, x1, x2〉 : x1 is Brigitte Bardot in w and x1 is kissing x2 in
w}
Lingens’s imagining in Situation 4 could be represented in a similar manner:
{〈w, x1, x2〉 : x1 is Rudolph Lingens and x1 attacks x2 in w}
The idea is that the first center, x1, is the ‘inside-center’, and the second
center, x2, is the ‘impersonal-de se-center’.
Now we could proceed from here by formulating and exploring a theory
based on this idea. The resulting theory would, I believe, be adequate
to cover the cases we’ve discussed, and would give us an account of the
inside-outside distinction. But it might, I fear, look a bit ad hoc. Instead
of building directly on this idea, I want to turn to a topic which should
seem at least somewhat relevant to the present discussion: how, in general,
we should handle attitudes about individuals, i.e. de re attitudes. What
I will argue in the following two chapters is that there are two plausible
approaches to de re attitudes in which a theory of de se imagining that
employs the ‘two centers’ idea embeds comfortably. I think looking more
carefully at how we might treat de re attitudes will make the this idea seem
more plausible.
17Steve Yablo first suggested this idea to me.
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1.4.1 Interlude on aspects of the inside-outside distinction
Before moving on to the next chapter, I briefly want to note some interest-
ing aspects of the inside-outside distinction which I will unfortunately not
be discussing in any detail.
One thing the Lakoff phenomenon makes vivid is that attitudes other
than imagining seem to admit of an inside-outside distinction, as Lakoff
(1972) notes. Lakoff’s original example involved dreaming, not imagining:
I dreamt that I was Brigitte Bardot and that I kissed me. Desiring and
wishing are similar, as Lakoff also observed: I may want to be President
but not want myself to be President (I want to be President, but think the
person I in fact am would do a terrible job, and do not want that person to
be President). Another example: Suppose that Sam is my enemy. If I am
a certain type of self-loathing character, I may want to be Sam and beat
me up; I want to be Sam and beat up the person I in fact am. What these
attitudes all seem to have in common is that they are counterfactual in the
sense that it is rational to bear these attitudes towards a content p even
if one believes that p is false. (Part of the next chapter will be devoted to
exploring counterfactual de re attitudes.)
Memory provides an interesting case.18 As has often been observed in
the literature, remembering admits of an inside-outside distinction, a fact
that also seems to be reflected by the grammar:
(7) a. I remember delivering the speech.
b. I remember myself delivering the speech.
Here (7b) may report a memory from the outside: I ‘see’ the speaker – me
– from a point of view that is not the speaker’s. (7a), on the other hand,
means I have a memory of giving the speech from the inside. If I was the
only one who delivered the speech, then, while others can remember me
delivering the speech, only I can remember delivering the speech.19 But,
interestingly, remembering seems not to be a counterfactual attitude.
Do Lakoff sentences involving remembers make sense?
(8) I remember being Brigitte Bardot and kissing me.
18See Higginbotham (2003) for discussion.
19There is also a difference between (7a) and (7b) on the one hand, and I remember
that I delivered the speech, on the other. The latter can be true even if I have do not
remember the event of my giving the speech at all, but simply know that I in fact did
give it (perhaps because I am told by others that I gave it). This seems related to the
psychologists’ distinction between semantic and episodic memory.
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I think I can make sense of this: I was once Brigitte Bardot, and when I
was, I kissed the person that I am now. If this does make sense, it would be
interesting to see what (if anything) this means for the theory of personal
identity over time.
Before wrapping up this interlude, let me also point out that, within
the category of imagining, we get something analogous to the inside-outside
distinction with respect to time. I can imagine that it’s now 1942: the tem-
poral perspective of my imagining is set at 1942. I can also imagine that
it’s 50 years from now, i.e. we are 50 years in the future from the present
time (whatever that time in fact is; I can imagine this even if I don’t what
know what year it is now). The two uses of now in those sentences seem
to parallel the two uses of I/me in the Lakoff sentences.
As you can see, our discussion thus far has only scratched the surface of
these issues. A full account of the inside-outside distinction should have
something to say about them all. Unfortunately, we must leave these as
matters for future inquiry.
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Chapter 2
Imagination, Descriptivism, and the De Re
In this chapter and the next, I discuss two related issues: what to say
about de re attitudes if one accepts Lewis’s view of the de se, and how to
solve the problem of the impersonal-de se. (Just how these issues are re-
lated will gradually emerge.) I begin by considering Lewis’s own approach
to de re attitudes, which is a ‘descriptivist’ account of the de re. In this
chapter, I accept descriptivism about the de re, but argue that Lewis’s ac-
count, as formulated, cannot be extended to counterfactual de re attitudes
(e.g. imagining, dreaming, wishing). I argue that a solution to this prob-
lem can be found if we accept the idea that counterfactual attitudes have
a two-dimensional structure: their contents are two-dimensional centered
intensions, or functions from centered worlds to centered propositions. I
show how this hypothesis solves both the problem of counterfactual atti-
tudes and the problem of the impersonal-de se.
One reason for being interested in Lewis’s account of the de re is that
it has given rise to an account of attitude ascriptions influential in the
formal semantics literature; this chapter ends with a discussion of attitude
ascriptions.
Chapter 3 looks at these same issues through an anti-descriptivist lens.
De re attitudes are thoughts about individuals. Many philosophers think
that to have a de re attitude about something one must stand in a relation
of acquaintance to that thing. In order for me to have beliefs, desires, etc.
about a certain individual, there must be a causal link between me and
that individual, a link through which information about that object can
travel. A relation of acquaintance is a causal link of this sort. Lewis (1979,
155) puts the idea this way:
I and the one of whom I have beliefs de re are so related that
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there is an extensive causal dependence of my states upon his;
and this causal dependence is of a sort apt for the reliable trans-
mission of information.
This is a plausible idea, but just what counts as being acquainted with
something it not entirely clear. Usually perceptual acquaintance with an
individual is taken to be sufficient for one to have de re beliefs about it: if
I see Ortcutt sneaking around on the docks, then I can come to have de re
beliefs about Ortcutt. On the other hand, being related to the res by ‘pure
description’ is usually taken to be insufficient: I think, on purely general
grounds, that the shortest spy is under six feet tall. Assuming that there
is a uniquely shortest spy, I still don’t count as having a de re belief about
him or her, since (we can suppose) I do not stand in an appropriate causal
relation to him or her.
In an effort to clarify what he has in mind, Lewis offers a list of examples
of possible types of de re belief (Lewis, 1979, 154-155). On Lewis’s view, I
can have de re beliefs:
• about my acquaintances, present or absent;
• about contemporary public figures prominent in the news;
• about the famous dead who feature prominently in history;
• about authors whose works I have read;
• about strangers now face to face with me;
• about strangers I am somehow tracing, such as the driver of the car
ahead of me, or the spy I am about to catch because he left so many
traces; and
• about people I have heard about under a particular name, e.g. about
the one I have heard of under the name “David Hume”.
I’ll assume that the notion of a relation of acquaintance is clear enough for
present purposes, and won’t seek to clarify it any further here.1
1For more discussion of this issue, see Burge (1977), Lewis (1979, 153 - 155), Stalnaker
(1988, 164 - 65), and Pryor (2004).
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2.1 The Naive Theory
In the previous chapter, we were tacitly assuming something like the fol-
lowing account of de re imagination:
Naive Theory
x imagines (de re) in w that y is F iff:
i. there is an acquaintance relation R such that x bears R
to y in w, and
ii. all the 〈w′, x′〉 compatible with what x imagines in w are
such that y is F in w.
(I take it that (ii) can only be true if (i) is true, in which case (i) is
redundant.) We could, of course, extend this account to attitudes other
than imagining, most notably belief. In discussing the Naive Theory, I will
focus on its account of de re belief. There are at least two objections to
this theory (Lewis, 1981).
The first is that it runs into trouble with some well-known puzzle cases,
cases which have dominated the study of de re attitudes. Quine (1956) tells
a story in which Ralph believes that Bernard J. Ortcutt, the town mayor
and a pillar of the community, would never engage in espionage. But Ralph
believes that that fellow [we point at a shadowy figure in a trench coat] is
a spy. Unbeknownst to Ralph, it turns out that that fellow is Ortcutt the
mayor.
The Naive Theory has the consequence that Ralph has inconsistent be-
liefs. But if rationality requires that one’s beliefs be consistent, then the
Naive Theory has the consequence that Ralph is not rational. But that
seems wrong: Ralph lacks information, not logical acumen. Faced with
such cases, some philosophers give up the idea that rationality requires
consistency, but we shall be exploring the possibility of avoiding that re-
sult.2
Additionally, since no centered worlds are compatible with what Ralph
believes, it would seem that Ralph does not have a coherent conception
of what the world is like. But this too seems wrong: Ralph does have a
2One view is that one can rationally hold inconsistent beliefs, as long as the in-
consistent propositions one believes are presented under different ‘guises’ or ‘modes of
presentation’. It may turn out that this is the best we can do. But appealing to the
primitive notion of a ‘guise’ is not illuminating, and it is at least worth trying to see
whether we can do better.
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coherent conception of what the world is like. Again, what he lacks is a
certain piece of information, namely that the the man he saw giving the
rousing speech is the man he saw sneaking around in a trench coat: in the
world according to Ralph, there is a mayor named “Ortcutt” and a spy in
trenchcoat, and the mayor is not the spy.
The second problem arises if individuals have non-trivial essential prop-
erties. Suppose Ortcutt essentially has DNA sequence d. Then every pos-
sible world w in which Ortcutt exists is one in which Ortcutt has DNA
sequence d. According to the Naive Theory, if Ralph believes anything
about Ortcutt, Ortcutt exists in every one of Ralph’s centered belief worlds.
Given the essentiality of DNA sequences, it follows that Ortcutt has DNA
sequence d in every one of Ralph’s centered belief worlds, and from this it
follows that that Ralph believes that Ortcutt has DNA sequence d. But this
just seems wrong—it seems that Ralph could have beliefs about Ortcutt
without having any opinions about Ortcutt’s DNA.
For these two reasons, Lewis rejects the Naive Theory. We shall follow
him in this.
2.2 Lewis on de re attitudes
Lewis’s account of de re attitudes is parasitic on his account of de se at-
titudes. In a sense, Lewis doesn’t think the de re constitutes a distinctive
class of attitudes: de re attitude ascriptions report facts that are partly
psychological and partly about the attitude holder’s relation to his envi-
ronment. The psychological part is simply a de dicto or a de se attitude.3
Here is the account:
Doxastic Lewis
x believes (de re) in w that y is F iff there is an acquaintance
relation R such that:
i. x bears R uniquely to y in w, and
ii. x believes (de se) in w that the unique thing to which she
bears R is F . (That is: all the 〈w′, x′〉 compatible with
what x believes in w are such that there is a y′ in w′ such
that x′ bears R uniquely to y′ in w′ and y′ is F in w′).
3The idea of factoring the de re into a psychological component and a fact about the
attitude holder’s relation to the world is due to Kaplan (1968). More on this later.
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This formulation makes explicit the way in which Lewis’s account ‘factor-
izes’ a de re belief into a psychological component which is purely de se,
and a non-psychological component concerning the agent’s relation to the
res.
If Ralph has a belief in w about Ortcutt in virtue of bearing R uniquely
to him, then any of the centered worlds 〈w′, x′〉 compatible with what Ralph
believes contain a unique individual y′ to which x′ bears R in w′. In the ter-
minology of Lewis (1983a), y′ for x′ in w′ is a counterpart by R-acquaintance
of Ortcutt for Ralph in w. In other words, y′ is ‘Ortcutt’s representative’ in
Ralph’s centered belief world 〈w′, x′〉, or Ortcutt’s representative relative
to R in 〈w′, x′〉.
In the puzzle case, Ortcutt has two different representatives in any one
of Ralph’s centered belief worlds. Suppose Ralph bears two different rela-
tions of acquaintance to Ortcutt: he knows Ortcutt as the mayor, because
he heard the man give a rousing speech on the stump; and he knows Ort-
cutt as the shadowy figure in a trenchcoat because he saw the man in a
trenchcoat in such-and-such circumstances. Ralph believes that Ortcutt
is not a spy relative to the first relation of acquaintance, but he believes
that Ortcutt is a spy relative to the second one. On Lewis’s account, this
means that: (i) Ralph heard Ortcutt give a rousing speech on the stump,
and Ralph believes (de se) that the man he heard giving a rousing speech
on the stump is not a spy; and (ii) Ralph saw Ortcutt in a trenchcoat in
such-and-such circumstances, and Ralph believes (de se) that the man he
saw in a trenchcoat in such-and-such circumstances is a spy. Once one is
clear about Ralph’s psychology, no puzzle remains.
Thus, any centered world 〈w, x〉 compatible with what Ralph believes
contains two individuals, y and z such that x saw y give a rousing speech
in w, and x saw z sneaking around in a trenchcoat in w. z is a spy in
w, y is not. y is Ortcutt’s representative (relative to the ‘speech’ acquain-
tance relation) in 〈w, x〉, and z is Ortcutt’s representative (relative to the
‘trenchcoat’ acquaintance relation) in 〈w, x〉.4
The Ortcutt case is a case in which someone thinks one is two, in virtue
of being acquainted with the same thing in two different ways. Also familiar
are cases of mistaken identity, or thinking that two are one. Suppose a
charming dog, Sparky, runs into my office on Tuesday. Then on Friday,
a similar-looking dog, Barky, runs into my office. I think, Oh, here’s that
friendly dog again. But I am mistaken: Sparky is not Barky. I have a
4See Lewis (1994, 323) for a similar treatment of Kripke’s (1979) case of puzzled
Pierre.
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‘doubly de re’ belief about Sparky and Barky (in virtue of seeing Sparky
run into my office on Tuesday and seeing Barky run into my office on
Friday) to the effect that the former is the latter. On Lewis’s account, my
de re belief can be decomposed into the following three facts:
• Sparky is the unique dog I saw in my office on Tuesday;
• Barky is the unique dog I saw in my office on Friday; and
• all the 〈w, x〉 compatible with what I believe are such that the unique
dog that x sees in his office on Tuesday in w is the unique dog that
x sees in his office on Friday in w.
Thus, the psychological part of my de re belief is a perfectly coherent de
se belief. Again, once we are clear about the subject’s psychology and his
relation to the world, no puzzle remains.
Lewis’s account also avoids the Naive Theory’s problem with essential
properties. Ralph bears R to Ortcutt, and has beliefs about Ortcutt, but
has no opinion about Ortcutt’s DNA sequence. All the centered worlds
〈w, x〉 compatible with what Ralph believes contain a unique individual y
to whom x bears R. If Ralph has no opinion as to whether Ortcutt has
DNA sequence d, then there is at least one 〈w, x〉 compatible with what
Ralph believes in which the unique individual y to whom x bears R in w is
such that y has DNA sequence d in w, and there is also at least one 〈w′, x′〉
compatible with what Ralph believes in which the unique individual y′ to
whom x′ bears R in w′ is such that y′ does not have DNA sequence d in w′.
If one’s DNA sequence is essential to one, then y 6= y′. On Lewis’s view, the
individual who represents Ortcutt in a given one of Ralph’s centered beliefs
worlds need not be identical to Ortcutt, nor need he be identical to the in-
dividual who represents Ortcutt in any of the other centered belief worlds.5
It’s worth noting that Lewis’s view is a variation on a theme that traces
back to Quine (1956) and Kaplan (1968). The basic idea of this approach
is to reduce the problematic de re attitudes to the less problematic de
dicto (or in Lewis’s case, de se) attitudes. (De re attitudes are thought
to be problematic since they give rise to the puzzles above.) Abstracting
from the specific details of Kaplan’s proposal, the general idea is that a
de re ascription consists of two components: First, a non-psychological
5Essential properties do, however, create a slightly different problem for Lewis’s ac-
count. See footnote 12 in §3.2.
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fact about how the agent is related to the res—namely, that the two are
‘acquainted’. And second, an underlying descriptive belief. The underlying
descriptive belief must be of a certain form: assume that the agent has a
descriptive concept – the G – under which she thinks of the res, and which
the res satisfies (the res is the unique G). Then, if the agent believes de
re that the res is F , the agent’s underlying de dicto (or de se) belief is the
belief that the G is F .
This basic idea can be implemented in a number of ways. For example,
in a possible worlds framework, the content of x’s underlying descriptive
belief would be the set of possible worlds w in which the G in w is F in
w. In that setup, the descriptive concept the G is a function from worlds
to individuals. In Lewis’s retelling of this story, all belief contents are sets
of centered worlds, and so the descriptive concept the G is a function from
centered worlds to individuals. (In these modal frameworks, descriptive
concepts are not linguistic descriptions, nor need they be expressible by a
linguistic description; fundamentally, they are functions from possibilities
to individuals.) Lewis also stipulates that the descriptive concept be deter-
mined by the relation of acquaintance that the agent bears uniquely to the
res, so that the psychological and non-psychological components of a de re
belief are systematically related.6 Thus, on Lewis’s picture, the descriptive
concept the G is always something like the one to whom I bear R uniquely,
for some acquaintance relation R. But despite these differences, it is clear
that Lewis’s view is simply an instance of this broader Kaplanian idea. I
mention this here, since the problem I am about to discuss applies not just
to Lewis’s theory, but to the more general picture behind it.
2.3 The problem of counterfactual attitudes
So far we have only talked about de re beliefs. The problem I shall outline
concerns not this account of belief, but rather its generalization to other
attitudes. Here is what the generalized theory says, for any attitude A:
General Lewis
x A’s (de re) in w that y has F iff there is an acquaintance
relation R such that:
i. x bears R uniquely to y in w, and
6Though see Lewis (1994, 318-319) for a slightly looser account of how de re belief
works.
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ii. x A’s (de se) in w that the unique thing to which she bears
R is F . (That is: all the 〈w′, x′〉 compatible with what x
A’s in w are such that there is a y′ in w′ such that x′ bears
R uniquely to y′ in w′ and y′ is F in w′).
‘A’ can be replaced by any attitude verb, e.g. believes, knows, desires, and,
importantly for what follows, wishes, dreams, and imagines.
As far as I know, Lewis only offered his theory as a theory of de re
belief. So nothing he says is directly threatened by the problem presented
here. Thus, when I say that Lewis’s account is incompatible with certain
apparent possibilities, I really mean that General Lewis is incompatible with
certain apparent possibilities.
The problem for General Lewis comes in the form of a counterexample.
Suppose Ralph sees Ortcutt sneaking around on the docks, and suppose
this is the only way in which Ralph is acquainted with Ortcutt. Call the
relation of acquaintance Ralph bears uniquely to Ortcutt ‘R’. It seems
that in virtue of bearing R uniquely to Ortcutt, Ralph is in a position to
have various de re attitudes about Ortcutt: he might, for example, come
to believe that Ortcutt is a spy, by believing that the individual to which
he is uniquely R-related is a spy.
But it also seems that bearing R uniquely to Ortcutt puts Ralph in
a position to think about various counterfactual situations in which Ort-
cutt figures. That is, Ralph might have de re imaginings about Ortcutt.
Now the problem for General Lewis: it seems that Ralph could imagine a
counterfactual scenario in which he is not acquainted with Ortcutt. For
example, Ralph could imagine a scenario in which he and Ortcutt never
cross paths, and do not know of each other’s existence. Perhaps in Ralph’s
imaginary scenario, he lives in Tokyo and Ortcutt in Alaska, and their two
lives are as causally separate as two lives could be. In this example, it
seems true that Ralph imagines that he is not acquainted with Ortcutt.
But on Lewis’s account, this cannot be true.
According to General Lewis, for it to be true in a world w that Ralph
imagines that he is not acquainted with Ortcutt, there must be an acquain-
tance relation R that has two properties:
i. Ralph bears R uniquely to Ortcutt; and
ii. All the centered worlds 〈w, x〉 compatible with what Ralph imagines
are such that there is a y in w such that x bears R uniquely to y in w
and x is not acquainted with y in w.
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But no centered world 〈w, x〉 can meet the condition specified in (ii), given
that R is an acquaintance relation. For x must both bear R uniquely to
some y in w and, at the same time, not be acquainted with that same y
in w. But if x bears R to y, then x is thereby acquainted with y. So no
centered world is compatible with what Ralph imagines, and the content of
Ralph’s imagining is empty. Thus, General Lewis incorrectly predicts that
Ralph cannot imagine that he is not acquainted with Ortcutt.
The problem is not limited to the attitude of imagining. Suppose Ralph
sees a man kissing his wife; it is dark, so Ralph can see little else about
the man. The man in question is Ortcutt. Ralph bears a relation of
acquaintance R uniquely to Ortcutt: the relation x bears to y just in case
x sees y kiss x’s wife. This puts him in a position to have de re attitudes
about Ortcutt: for example, he might believe that Ortcutt is a man of low
character. The trouble comes with a de re wish that Ralph might have
about Ortcutt: he might wish that Ortcutt had not kissed his wife. Again,
according to General Lewis, two things must be true for Ralph to so wish:
i. Ortcutt is the man Ralph sees kiss his wife, and
ii. All the centered worlds 〈w, x〉 compatible with what Ralph wishes are
such that there is a unique y in w such that x sees y kiss x’s wife in
w, and y does not kiss x’s wife in w.
But since seeing is a factive attitude, no centered world satisfies the condi-
tion set forth in (ii). General Lewis entails the falsehood that Ralph cannot,
in this scenario, wish that Ortcutt did not kiss his wife.
It seems that the problem will arise for any type of de re attitude that
one can reasonably bear to a content p even when one believes that p is false:
it will arise for any counterfactual attitude (§1.4.1). We have the ability to
represent individuals in counterfactual circumstances, circumstances that
we believe do not obtain. This ability serves a variety of purposes, and is
something that a theory of attitudes ought to accommodate.
As I noted earlier, Lewis’s view of de re attitudes is the result of merging
his view of de se attitudes with a broadly Kaplanian understanding of the
de re. I also mentioned earlier that the problem of counterfactual attitudes
is a problem not just for Lewis’s view, but for the Kaplanian picture behind
it. This is clearest when we look at an implementation of Kaplan’s idea in
a possible worlds framework (which is of course only minimally different
from the centered worlds framework). Suppose one took the following view
of de re attitudes:
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x A’s (de re) in w that y has F iff there is an acquaintance
relation R such that:
i. x bears R uniquely to y in w,
ii. y is the unique G in w, and
iii. all the worlds w′ compatible with what x A’s in w are such
that the G in w′ is F in w′.7
It’s not hard to see that this view will run into the problem of counterfactual
attitudes: Suppose Ralph believes (de re) that Ortcutt is a spy. Suppose
Ralph’s descriptive concept of Ortcutt is the bald man in the brown hat,
here understood to be the function which maps each world w to the unique
bald brown-hatted man in w. Then the content of the relevant underlying
belief is the set of worlds w′ such that the bald man in the brown hat in w′
is a spy in w′. But surely Ralph can also imagine (de re) that Ortcutt is a
hirsute man with no hat. But the content of Ralph’s underlying imagining
would then be the set of worlds w′ such that the bald man in the brown
hat in w′ is not bald and has no hat in w′. But that is the empty set.
A question remains about the scope of the problem. It’s easiest (for
me, at least) to see how the problem arises in these modal frameworks, but
its application may be wider. Consider the following broad view:
xA’s (de re) in w that y has F (relative to acquaintance relation
R) iff:
i. x bears R uniquely to y in w,
ii. y is the unique G in w, and
iii. x A’s (de dicto) in w that the G is F .
It seems to me that any specific proposal which is an instance of this
schematic view will face the problem of counterfactual attitudes. For sup-
pose that Ralph’s descriptive concept of Ortcutt is the G (here we remain
neutral on just how the theory interprets the notion of a descriptive con-
cept). The problem is that any view of this sort will wind up entailing
that Ralph cannot imagine/wish/dream (de re) that Ortcutt is not the G,
for this would be to imagine/wish/dream (de dicto) that the G is not the
7One would probably want to require the descriptive concept the G to be sufficiently
‘vivid’ (cf. Kaplan, 1968). Alternatively, one might require that the agent’s de dicto
beliefs about the G be counterfactually sensitive to facts about y.
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G. This seems like it would be a problem even for views not couched in a
possible worlds or centered worlds framework. But, without specific views
on the table, it is difficult to establish this general point. Since our main
concern is what to say about the de re if one accepts Lewis’s view of the de
se, we leave as a question for future inquiry just how broadly the problem
of counterfactual attitudes applies.8
2.4 A two-dimensional account
Suppose we want to maintain Lewis’s view of de re belief. What should
we say about counterfactual attitudes?
On Lewis’s account, we think of individuals under descriptive concepts.
For example, Ralph might think of Ortcutt under the description the one
I saw sneaking around on the docks. The problem of counterfactual atti-
tudes arises because Ralph can imagine situations in which Ortcutt fails
to satisfy the description under which Ralph thinks of him. Let’s try to
get inside Ralph’s mind for a moment. When Ralph imagines that he is
not acquainted with Ortcutt, Ralph might put this to himself by saying,
“The guy who is in fact the one I saw sneaking around on the docks—I’m
imagining that I am not acquainted with him. Since I’m imagining that
I’m not acquainted with him, he’s not ‘the one I see sneaking around on
the docks’ in my imaginary scenario. Indeed, I’m not imagining that I saw
anyone sneaking around on the docks.”
Now, it is very tempting to think that when Ralph says to himself
“the guy who is in fact the one I saw sneaking around on the docks”,
Ralph ‘reaches back’ to the actual world and puts the the actual person
that he saw sneaking around on the docks – namely, Ortcutt – into his
centered imagination worlds, so that the content of his imagining is the set
of centered worlds in which the center is not acquainted with Ortcutt. But
this simply gets us back to the Naive Theory, and we know that that view
faces troubles of its own.
Nevertheless, something seems right about this idea of ‘reaching back’.
But maybe when Ralph says to himself “the guy who is in fact the one
I saw sneaking around on the docks”, he reaches back not to the actual
world, but to his centered belief worlds. He ‘grabs’ the person who satisfies
that descriptive concept in his centered belief worlds and imagines that
8Perhaps if we replace “the G” in clause (iii) with “the actual G”, the resulting theory
will avoid the problem. But in any modal theory of attitudes, rigidifying the description
just leads back to (some version of) the Naive Theory.
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he is not acquainted with that guy. But that guy need not be the one
the center of the centered imagination worlds saw sneaking around on the
docks—indeed, there may not be anyone that the center of the centered
imagination worlds sees sneaking around on the docks, for Ralph may not
be imagining that he’s seeing someone sneaking around on the docks.
The idea here is that the content of Ralph’s imagining is somehow
anaphoric on the content of his beliefs. I think this is basically the right
intuition, but the way I put it in the above paragraph isn’t quite adequate,
because of a difference between the actual world and Ralph’s centered belief
worlds, namely that the former is one and the latter are many. If Ralph
were to reach back to the actual world, he would be able to ‘grab’ the
guy who he saw sneaking around on the docks in that world. The reason
this makes sense is that there is only one actual world for Ralph to reach
back to, and so there is a unique individual in that world who Ralph saw
sneaking around on the docks. That individual could then be imported into
Ralph’s centered imagination worlds. But the idea that Ralph reaches back
to his centered belief worlds cannot work exactly like that. The problem
is that, so long as Ralph is not maximally opinionated, there will be more
than one centered world compatible with what he believes. And there is
simply no guarantee that the individual who satisfies the description “the
one I saw sneaking around on the docks” relative to one of Ralph’s centered
belief worlds will be identical to the individual who satisfies that description
relative to another. There might be different individuals in these different
centered worlds, each of whom satisfies that description relative to his ‘own’
respective centered belief world. Which of these many individuals is the
one we should import into Ralph’s centered imagination worlds?
Forget that question for the moment, and think about what we would
say if Ralph were maximally opinionated. Suppose, for example, that 〈w, x〉
were the only centered world compatible with what Ralph believes, and
that there is a unique individual – call him “Bill” – in w such that x bears
R uniquely to Bill in w. Bill is Ortcutt’s representative in 〈w, x〉. In this
case, if Ralph were to imagine that he was not acquainted with Ortcutt,
it seems like it would be reasonable to say that the content of Ralph’s
imagining would be the set of centered worlds 〈w′, x′〉 in which x′ is not
acquainted with Bill in w′. Bill would count as Ortcutt’s representative in
〈w′, x′〉 in virtue of the fact that he is Ortcutt’s representative in Ralph’s
centered belief world 〈w, x〉.
We still face the problem about what to do if Ralph is not maximally
opinionated. But the above case is suggestive. One thing it suggests is
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that if we were to pick one of Ralph’s centered belief worlds and then
pretend momentarily that it was his only centered belief world, then we
would be able to characterize his centered imagination worlds relative to
that centered belief world. Note that we could go through each of Ralph’s
centered belief worlds and do this.
The emerging idea is that we can characterize a set of centered worlds
compatible with what Ralph imagines relative to one of his centered belief
worlds. What does this mean? The previous paragraph suggests a proce-
dure for deciding whether or not a centered world 〈w, x〉 is compatible with
what Ralph imagines relative to one his centered belief worlds 〈w′, x′〉. The
procedure is simple: we simply ask ourselves, “Would 〈w, x〉 be compatible
with what Ralph imagined if 〈w′, x′〉 were his only centered belief world?”
If the answer is ‘yes’, then 〈w, x〉 is compatible with what Ralph imagines
relative to 〈w′, x′〉. If the answer is ‘no’, then it is not.
This ‘decision procedure’ idea shouldn’t be taken too seriously; it’s
really just a heuristic for getting an intuitive grip on what I think we
should regard as a primitive notion in our theory of imagining: the notion
of a centered world’s being compatible with what someone imagines relative
to one of her centered belief worlds. (For one thing, we may not always
be that good at assessing counterfactuals of the form If x were maximally
opinionated, then 〈w′, x′〉 would be compatible with what she imagines.)
If this view is on the right track, then what it suggests is that the
content of Ralph’s imagining determines a function that takes a centered
belief world 〈w, x〉 and returns a set of centered worlds, the set of centered
worlds compatible with what Ralph imagines relative to 〈w, x〉. Formally,
then, the content of Ralph’s imagining determines a function from centered
worlds to sets of centered worlds, or a two-dimensional centered intension.9
We shall identify the contents of imaginings with such intensions. On this
view, “the set of centered worlds compatible with what Ralph imagines” is
an improper definite description, for there is no such unique set. There are
only sets of centered imagination worlds relative to centered belief worlds.
Although this view does not allow us to say what it is for a centered
world to be compatible with what Ralph imagines simpliciter (we can only
characterize this notion of compatibility relative to one of his centered
belief worlds), we can say what it is for a pair of centered worlds to be
compatible with what Ralph imagines simpliciter. This ‘absolute’ notion
9A two-dimensional centered intension can also be represented by a set of pairs of
centered worlds, or by a function from centered worlds to a function from centered worlds
to truth values.
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can be defined in terms of the ‘relative’ notion as follows:
〈〈w′, x′〉, 〈w′′, x′′〉〉 is compatible with what x imagines in w iff:
〈w′, x′〉 is compatible with what x believes in w, and 〈w′′, x′′〉
is compatible with what x imagines in w relative to 〈w′, x′〉.
Then we can say that x imagines a two-dimensional centered intension p iff
all the 〈〈w′, x′〉, 〈w′′, x′′〉〉 compatible with what x imagines are contained
in p.
It should be clear how this account solves the problem of counterfactual
attitudes. Suppose Ralph bears R to Ortcutt. When Ralph imagines
that he is not acquainted with Ortcutt, we can characterize Ralph’s state
of mind as follows: Any arbitrary centered world 〈w, x〉 compatible with
what he believes contains a unique individual y to whom x is uniquely
R-related; y is Ortcutt’s representative in 〈w, x〉. Relative to that centered
belief world, the set of centered worlds 〈w′, x′〉 compatible with what he
imagines is such that x′ is not acquainted with y in w′; y represents Ortcutt
throughout these imagination alternatives in virtue of representing him in
the centered belief world 〈w, x〉. On this account, the content of Ralph’s
imagining can be characterized by the following two-dimensional centered
intension:
{〈〈w, x〉, 〈w′, x′〉〉 : there is a y in w such that x is uniquely
R-related to y in w, and x′ is not acquainted with y in w′}
Suppose Ralph thinks of Ortcutt under the descriptive concept the G.
Our account allows us to first search one of Ralph’s centered belief worlds,
find the individual who, in that centered belief world, is the unique G, and
so represents Ortcutt there. We then use that individual to characterize
Ortcutt’s imagination alternatives relative to the designated centered belief
world. This procedure allows to identify that individual independently of
the properties he has in the centered imagination worlds, which means
that he need not be the thing (if there is one) that the is the unique G
in the centered imagination worlds. This is how we avoid the problem of
counterfactual attitudes.
Our general account of de re imagining will look like this:
2D De Re Imagination
x imagines de re in w that y is F iff there is an acquaintance
relation R such that:
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i. x bears R uniquely to y in w, and
ii. every 〈〈w′, x′〉, 〈w′′, x′′〉〉 compatible with what x imagines
in w is such that there is a unique y′ in w′ such that x′
bears R to y′ in w′, and y′ is F in w′′.
The first centered world in any pair of centered worlds compatible with
what an agent imagines is one of the agent’s centered belief worlds. Thus,
on this account, to say, for example, that 〈〈w, x〉, 〈w′, x′〉〉 is compatible
with what Ralph imagines entails that 〈w, x〉 is compatible with what Ralph
believes. This means that, on our account of de re imagining, to say
that Ralph imagines that Ortcutt is F is to say something about Ralph’s
centered belief worlds, namely that there is an acquaintance relation R such
that that in every one of Ralph’s centered belief worlds there is a unique
individual to which the center bears R. The content of a de re imagining
is inextricably connected to the content of one’s de re beliefs.10
2.5 De se imagining again
At the end of Chapter 1, I noted that in order to solve the problem of the
impersonal-de se, we would likely need something like two different centers,
one representing the counterfactual-self, one representing the belief-self. It
seems that the present proposal furnishes us with exactly what we need.
Recall that the counterfactual-self is (to put things intuitively, if impre-
cisely) who one is imagining being from the inside; the belief-self is the
10The proposal developed in this section may worry some actualists, for we seem to
be re-identifying purely possible individuals across possible worlds. Suppose that 〈w, x〉
is one of Ralph’s centered belief worlds, and that y is the unique thing in w to which x
bears R. Now in order to characterize Ralph’s imagination alternatives, we make claims
about what this same y is like in the centered worlds 〈w′, x′〉 compatible with what
Ralph imagines relative to 〈w, x〉. And of course some of these 〈w′, x′〉 may be such that
w′ 6= w. And note also that y may not be identical to any actual individual.
The problem is that while many actualists don’t mind talking about ‘non-actual indi-
viduals’ when those individuals are confined to a single world, they hesitate to re-identify
a particular non-actual individual across possible worlds (McMichael, 1983). This is a
problem, but it is worth noting that the problem isn’t one actualists could otherwise
avoid, since the problem already arises in connection with sentences like Kripke could
have had a son who was a musician but could have been a plumber. If a solution to
that problem is found, one would hope that that solution could be extended to solve the
problem generated by our proposal. Alternatively, we might be able avoid this problem
entirely simply by adopting a counterpart-theoretic approach to the claims in question:
it need not be y herself who re-appears in w′, but merely a metaphysical counterpart of
y, i.e. something that has all of y’s (qualitative) essential properties.
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individual in one’s imaginary scenario who represents the individual one
actually takes oneself to be. Given that we are now representing imag-
inative possibilities as pairs of centered worlds, it is natural to identify
the belief-self with the first center in a pair of centered worlds, and the
counterfactual-self with the second center in the pair. The belief-self is
imported into the the centered imagination worlds from the centered belief
worlds.
The problem of the impersonal-de se can be thought of as the problem
of characterizing Lingens’s imagining in Situation 3. In that situation,
amnesiac Lingens has an imagining he reports using (5a):
(5a) I imagined that I was Brigitte Bardot and that I kissed me.
Take one of Lingens’s centered belief worlds, 〈w, x〉. What must a centered
world 〈w′, x′〉 be like in order to be compatible with what Lingens imagines
relative to 〈w, x〉? The obvious answer is that x′ (the counterfactual-self)
must be Brigitte Bardot in w′, and x′ must be kissing x (the belief-self) in
w′.11 In other words, the content of the imagining is:
{〈〈w, x〉, 〈w′, x′〉〉 : x′ is Brigitte Bardot in w′ and x′ is kissing
x in w′}
And this is a perfectly coherent content. A similar treatment of Situa-
tions 1 and 4 can be given. So the present proposal solves the problem
of the impersonal-de se. Thus, we kill two birds with one stone: our two-
dimensional approach solves both the problem of counterfactual attitudes
and the problem of the impersonal-de se.
Implicit in the above discussion is a characterization of the three types of
imagining we discussed in Chapter 1: inside, outside, and the impersonal-
de se. Let us make this characterization explicit.
In formulating an account of these different kinds of imagining, we
again face a choice about whether to characterize the de se-de dicto dis-
tinction in terms of boring vs. interesting centered propositions or in terms
of centered vs. possible worlds propositions (see §1.2.1). In this case, it is
simpler to do the former; now that we have two-dimensional intensions, if
we did the latter, we would end up with four different kinds of functions
(functions from centered worlds to centered propositions, functions from
11Actually, we should first find Bardot’s representative in 〈w, x〉 and then import her
(the representative) into 〈w′, x′〉. For simplicity, I ignore this complication.
46
2. Imagination, Descriptivism, and the De Re
centered worlds to possible worlds propositions, functions from possible
worlds to centered propositions, and functions from possible worlds to pos-
sible worlds propositions). To avoid this, we will instead take the contents
of all imaginings to be two-dimensional centered intensions, and define two
different boring-interesting distinctions for these intensions.
On the new view, we have essentially two ways in which an imagin-
ing can be de se: it can be about the me of my beliefs, or about the
me of my imaginings. (As the Lakoff case shows, a single imagining can
be de se in both ways.) To capture this, we need to define two different
kinds of de se contents, which means we have two different ways for a
two-dimensional centered intension to be interesting : it can imagination-
interesting (i-interesting), or it can be belief-interesting (b-interesting).
Let’s start with the former:
i-boring vs. i-interesting :
• A two-dimensional centered intension p is i-boring iff for all w, w′, and
x in w and x′, y′ in w′: 〈〈w, x〉, 〈w′, x′〉〉 ∈ p iff 〈〈w, x〉, 〈w′, y′〉〉 ∈ p.
• A two-dimensional centered intension is i-interesting iff it is not i-
boring.
Using these terms, we can characterize the inside-outside distinction as
follows:
2D Uncentered Imagination
The content of an imagining from the outside an i-boring two-
dimensional centered intension.
For all imaginings I, I is an imagining from the outside just in
case the content of I is an i-boring two-dimensional centered
intension.
2D Centered Imagination
The content of an imagining from the inside an i-interesting
two-dimensional centered intension.
For all imaginings I, I is an imagining from the inside just in
case the content of I is an i-interesting two-dimensional cen-
tered intension.
The content of an outside imagining – an i-boring two-dimensional cen-
tered intension – is a function from centered worlds to boring centered
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propositions, (which is more or less equivalent to a function from centered
worlds to possible worlds propositions). Given one of the subject’s centered
belief worlds, the function gives back a boring centered proposition, which
represents the fact that the imagining doesn’t engage the counterfactual-
self. The imagining is not ‘from the perspective’ of anyone in the imagined
scenario, though it might be about the belief-self.
In order to characterize impersonal-de se imagining, we need the notion
of a belief-interesting (b-interesting) two-dimensional centered intension:
b-boring vs. b-interesting :
• A two-dimensional centered intension p is b-boring iff for all w, w′,
and x and y in w, x′ in w′: 〈〈w, x〉, 〈w′, x′〉〉 ∈ p iff 〈〈w, y〉, 〈w′, x′〉〉 ∈
p.
• A two-dimensional centered intension is b-interesting iff it is not b-
boring.
A b-boring two-dimensional centered intension is a function p from a cen-
tered world 〈w, x〉 to a centered proposition, where p isn’t sensitive to the
value of x: it returns the same centered proposition no matter what value
is assigned to x. The x-coordinate is idle, and so the function is essentially
equivalent to a function from possible worlds to centered propositions. This
reflects the fact that if a b-boring two-dimensional centered intension were
the content of an imagining, the imagining wouldn’t be about the agent’s
belief-self. Using this notion we can characterize impersonal-de se imagin-
ings:
2D Impersonal-De Se Imagination
The content of an impersonal-de se imagining is a b-interesting
two-dimensional centered intension.
For all imaginings I, I is an impersonal-de se imagining just in
case the content of I is a b-interesting two-dimensional centered
intension.
Note that on this taxonomy, any imagining is either from the inside or
from the outside, but never both. But an imagining can be from the inside
and impersonal-de se, as in the Bardot case, as well as in more mundane
cases when one imagines being oneself (i.e. when the counterfactual-self
and the belief-self coincide). An imagining can also be from the outside
48
2. Imagination, Descriptivism, and the De Re
and impersonal-de se, as when, for example, amnesiac Lingens imagines
from the outside that he himself is skiing down a steep hill (see Situation
1 in §1.3).
According to our account, the contents of counterfactual attitudes will
be two-dimensional centered intensions, while the contents of beliefs (and
belief-like attitudes such as knowledge) could be represented as a centered
propositions, as they are on Lewis’s view of de re belief. However, if one
desired that the objects of all attitudes be things of the same kind, we could
instead take the objects of belief to be two-dimensional centered intensions;
one of the ‘dimensions’ will simply be idle.12
Whether or not one accepts the idea that the content of an imagining
should be characterized as a two-dimensional centered intension, I think
12The idea of characterizing the content of an attitude as a two-dimensional intension
may also be needed by Chalmers/Jackson-style two-dimensionalists, since they seem to
face their own problem of counterfactual attitudes. To see this, suppose the following
things:
• I am ignorant of the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
• My 1-intension for Hesperus is: λw. the celestial body that appears in the morning
in w.
• My 1-intension for Phosphorus is: λw. the celestial body that appears in the
evening in w.
• I believe (truly) that it isn’t an essential property of Hesperus that it appears in
the morning.
• I believe (truly) that it isn’t an essential property of Phosphorus that it appears
in the evening.
If that’s what my belief state is like, then it would seem that I can imagine:
that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, and that Hesperus does not appear in
the morning, and that Phosphorus does not appear in the evening.
But this has an empty 1-intension, since there is no world w in which the celestial body
that appears in the morning in w does not appear in the morning in w. And it also
has an empty 2-intension, since there is no world w in which the thing that is actually
Phosphorus (i.e. Venus) is distinct from the thing that is actually Hesperus (Venus).
The way out is to take the the content of the imagining to be the relevant two-
dimensional intension:
{〈w,w′〉 : the celestial body that appears in the morning in w is not the
celestial body that appears in evening in w, and the celestial body that
appears in the morning in w does not appear in the morning in w′, and
the celestial body that appears in the evening in w does not appear in the
evening in w′}
(Cf. Chalmers (2002b, 163) on the two-dimensional content of sentences like: “If water
is XYZ, then water could not be H2O.”)
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that if one is a descriptivist about the de re, then one should accept the
basic intuition driving our theory: that counterfactual attitudes ought to
be understood in relation to the ‘base’ attitude of belief. There may be
other ways of cashing out this basic intuition; if there are, it would be
interesting to compare them to the present proposal. But I leave this as a
matter for future inquiry.
2.6 Attitude ascription
2.6.1 The Lewisian account
While Lewis’s account of de se attitudes is popular in the philosophical
literature, his account of the de re is less so, not least because descriptivism
about the de re has fallen out of favor in recent years (a point I will discuss
a bit more at the beginning of the next chapter). But Lewis’s account of the
de re has inspired a certain approach to the semantics of de re ascription
that has some claim to being the dominant approach to de re ascription
among formal semanticists. There are a number of different accounts in
this vein, but all are essentially variants of Cresswell and von Stechow
(1982).13 The particular formulation I’ll rely on is based on one discussed
in Anand (2006, Ch.1). The basic semantic framework used here is the
same as the one introduced in §1.2; we also retain the account of de se
ascription discussed in that section.
Consider sentence (9):
(9) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.14
On Lewis’s account, this sentence is true at a world w just in case there
is an acquaintance relation R that Ralph bears uniquely to Ortcutt, and
is such that that Ralph believes (de se) that the one to whom he bears R
13See, for example, von Stechow (1982), Heim (1994a), Abusch (1997), Anand (2006),
and Maier (2006).
14In my discussion, I assume that attitude reports in which proper names, indexicals,
and pronouns occur within the scope of the attitude verb report de re attitudes. This
is not uncontroversial, since our practices of attitude ascription may allow us to use an
attitude report of that type even when the agent is not acquainted with the res in the
sense discussed at the outset of this chapter. One could respond to this in one of two ways:
one could relax the acquaintance requirements on de re attitudes considerably; or one
could deny that every attitude report in which proper names, indexicals, and pronouns
occur within the scope of the attitude verb reports an attitude that is genuinely de
re. See Sosa (1970) Chisholm (1976), Burge (1977, 346), Chisholm (1981, Ch.9), Pryor
(2004), and Anand (2006, 20) for discussion.
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uniquely is a spy. How do we predict this truth condition for (9)? What
would the semantic value of believes have to be like? What would the LF
of (9) have to be like?
The theory we adopt assumes that the LF of (9) is given by (10):
(10) Ralph [[believes Ortcutt] [λ1 λ2 t2 is a spy]]
Let me make a few comments about this structure. First, the account
hypothesizes that Ortcutt moves out of the lower clause and into an argu-
ment position of the attitude verb. When Ortcutt moves, it leaves behind
a trace, here ‘t2’, which is bound by the variable binder ‘λ2’, so that the
third argument of the attitude verb is a ‘centered property’ (a function
from individuals to centered propositions) rather than a centered propo-
sition. The variable binder ‘λ1’ does not actually bind anything in this
particular structure; it is present to ensure that the third argument is a
centered property.
The lexical entry for believes looks like this:
JbelievesKc,i,g = λrese.λp〈s,〈e,et〉〉.λatte. there is an acquaintance
relation R such that R(wi)(att) = res, and all the centered
worlds 〈w, x〉 compatible with what att believes at wi are such
that p(w)(x)(R(w)(x)) = 1.15
Here we take relations of acquaintance to be two-place functions that take
a possible world and an individual and deliver an individual; R(w)(x)=
the unique individual y to whom x bears R in w. With the LF in (10) and
the above semantic value for believes, we end up with the following truth
conditions for (9):
JRalph believes Ortcutt λ1 λ2 t2 is a spyKc,i,g = 1 iff
There is an acquaintance relation R such that R(wi)(Ralph) = Ort-
cutt, and all the centered worlds 〈w, x〉 compatible with what Ralph
believes at wi are such that λw′.Jλ1 λ2 t2 is a spyKc,i,g(w)(x)(R(w)(x))
= 1 iff
There is an acquaintance relation R such that R(wi)(Ralph) = Ort-
cutt, and all the centered worlds 〈w, x〉 compatible with what Ralph
believes at wi are such that R(w)(x) is a spy in w′.
15This entry only deals with the ‘singly de re’ case, i.e. the case in which there is only
one res expression in the complement clause. I will only be discussing this case. For a
suggestion on how to generalize the account, see Cresswell and von Stechow (1982).
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And this is precisely the result we want.
One interesting feature of this approach is that it combines a ‘direct ref-
erence’ semantics for names, pronouns, and indexicals with descriptivism
about attitude contents. Though this account of de re ascription is often
discussed in the formal semantics literature (as I noted earlier), the pos-
sibility of combining this type of account of referring expressions with a
descriptivist account of attitudes seems to have been largely overlooked in
the philosophical literature dealing with these topics.16
It should be clear that the problem of counterfactual attitudes extends
to this theory of de re ascription. The problem is not with the account
of believes, but with extending the theory to cover counterfactual attitude
verbs like wishes, imagines, and dreams. Consider sentence (11):
(11) Ralph imagined that he had never been acquainted with Ortcutt.
I take it that this sentence is true in the situation we described in §2.3,
in which Ralph imagines a scenario in which Ortcutt and he never cross
paths. But this semantic theory incorrectly predicts that (11) is false in
that situation. Indeed, this theory predicts that there is no world at which
(11) is true (it is is necessarily false). For consider any world w:
JRalph imagined Ortcutt λ1 λ2 he1 had never been acquainted with
t2Kc,w,g = 1 iff
There is an acquaintance relation R such that R(w)(Ralph) = Ort-
cutt, and all the centered worlds 〈w′, x′〉 compatible with what Ralph
imagines at w are such that λw′′.Jλ1 λ2 he1 had never been acquainted
with t2Kc,w′′,g(w′)(x′)
(R(w′)(x′)) = 1 iff
There is an acquaintance relation R such that R(w)(Ralph) = Ort-
cutt, and all the centered worlds 〈w′, x′〉 compatible with what Ralph
imagines at w are such that x′ is never acquainted with R(w′)(x′) in
w′.
The problem with this is that R is acquaintance relation, and R(w′)(x′) is
the individual to whom x′ bears R in w′. Thus, the sentence is true only
if there is an acquaintance relation R such that all the 〈w′, x′〉 compatible
with Ralph imagines in w are such that x′ is not acquainted in w with
16Though see Shier (1996) and Bach (1997).
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the individual to whom x′ bears R in w. But no acquaintance relation
meets that condition, and so the sentence is false at w. But since w was
an arbitrary world, the same holds for every world, and so (11) comes out
necessarily false on this account. But of course (11) is true at some worlds:
we described one such world earlier. So this account of imagines should be
abandoned. Similar counterexamples could be given for the corresponding
accounts of wishes and dreams.
2.6.2 A two-dimensional refinement
In light of our revision to (or perhaps extension of) Lewis’s theory, we can
see where a solution lies. There might be a number of ways to change the
semantics so that it avoids the problem of counterfactual attitudes but the
least invasive, most conservative route is simply to change the lexical entry
of imagines as follows:
JimaginesKc,i,g = λrese.λp〈s,〈e,et〉〉.λatte. there is an acquain-
tance relationR such thatR(wi)(att) = res, and every 〈〈w, x〉, 〈w′, x′〉〉
compatible with what att imagines at wi is such that there is a
y such that R(w)(x) = y, and p(w′)(x′)(y) = 1.
If we adopt this revision, we needn’t even revise the semantic type of a
counterfactual attitude verb. On this theory, while the contents of imagin-
ings are two-dimensional centered intensions, the complement of imagines
is still a function from individuals to centered propositions. Thus, a nice
feature of our account of imagining is that it requires only a minimal change
to our preferred account of the semantics of attitude ascriptions.
Given the above lexical entry, if the LF of (11) is:
Ralph [[imagined Ortcutt] [λ1 λ2 he1 had never been acquainted
with t2]]
then we can compute the truth conditions of (11) as follows:
JRalph imagined Ortcutt λ1 λ2 he1 had never been acquainted with
t2Kc,w,g = 1 iff
There is an acquaintance relation R such that R(w)(Ralph) = Ort-
cutt, and every 〈〈w′, x′〉, 〈w′′, x′′〉〉 compatible with what Ralph imag-
ines at w is such that there is a y′ such that R(w′)(x′) = y′, and
λw′′′.Jλ1 λ2 he1 had never been acquainted with t2Kc,w′′′,g(w′′)(x′′)(y′) =
1 iff
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There is an acquaintance relation R such that R(w)(Ralph) = Ort-
cutt, and every 〈〈w′, x′〉, 〈w′′, x′′〉〉 compatible with what Ralph imag-
ines at w is such that there is a y′ such that R(w′)(x′) = y′, and x′′
is not acquainted with y′ in w′′.
Since there are worlds that meet this condition, the sentence is not neces-
sarily false on this semantics.
Finally, let me say something about the impersonal-de se. Recall Sit-
uation 1 from §1.3. In that Situation, amnesiac Lingens imagines, in the
impersonal-de se way, that he himself is skiing down a steep hill, i.e. he
imagines this from the outside. How would we report this imagining? We’d
report it by saying something like:
(12) Lingens imagined that he was skiing down a steep hill.
Given what we’ve said about the semantics thus far, (12) is ambiguous
between two structures, one in which he is bound, and one in which it’s
free (recall §1.2). When he is bound, the inside reading is generated. When
he is free, our new account of de re ascription tells us that it moves into
an argument position closer to the verb. Here are the two structures:
• Lingens imagined λ1 he1 was skiing down a steep hill. (bound, ‘inside
reading’)
• Lingens imagined he1 λ2 t2 was skiing down a steep hill. (free, ‘de re
reading’)
Now the bound structure of (12) is not true in Situation 1 because Lingens
isn’t imagining skiing from the inside. So if that sentence has true reading
in Situation 1, it must be the free structure that is true, which gives us
the de re reading. How then can (12) be true in that Situation, given that
Lingens’s imagining is impersonal-de se? It can be true in that Situation
because the impersonal-de se can be understood as a special case of the de
re. The trick is to allow the relation of identity to count as a relation of
acquaintance; after all, as Lewis (1979, 156) writes, “identity is a relation
of acquaintance par excellence.”
According to our account of the impersonal-de se, Lingens imagines,
in the impersonal-de se way, that he is skiing down a steep hill iff all the
〈〈w, x〉, 〈w′, x′〉〉 compatible with what he imagines are such that x is skiing
down a steep hill in w′. But then Lingens imagines, in the impersonal-de
se way, that he is skiing down a steep hill iff:
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• Lingens bears the relation of identity to Lingens; and
• all the 〈〈w, x〉, 〈w′, x′〉〉 compatible with what he imagines are such
that there is a unique y in w such that x bears the relation of identity
to y, and y is skiing down a steep hill in w′.
But that means that if Lingens imagines, in the impersonal-de se way that
he is skiing down a steep hill, then Lingens imagines de re that he is skiing
down a steep hill. Impersonal-de se imagining is de re imagining where
the acquaintance relation is identity.
So (12) can be true in Situation 1, because (12) has a reading on which
it is true iff Lingens imagines de re that he is skiing down the hill. Since
impersonal-de se imagining is a species of de re imagining, then if Lin-
gens impersonally-de se imagines skiing down a steep hill – as he does in
Situation 1 – sentence (12) will be true on its de re reading.17
2.6.3 Acquaintance relations: existential quantification vs. con-
textually supplied?
On the proposed treatment of de re ascriptions, those ascriptions involve
existential quantification over relations of acquaintance. Some theorists
think that de re ascriptions are context sensitive in a certain way (Abusch,
1997, n. 9): on their view, (9) for example will be true in a context in
which the ‘trenchcoat’ acquaintance relation is salient, and false in one in
which the ‘mayor’ acquaintance relation is salient.18
(9) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
But on the view we’ve taken, that sentence will be true in any context
as long as there is some acquaintance relation R such that Ralph believes
that the one to whom he bears R uniquely is a spy.
I don’t know which of these views is correct (see Anand (2006, Ch.1)
for some discussion). But the ‘contextualist’ view can be obtained rather
easily from our story by adding that the domain of quantification can be
17Note that on our approach, the impersonal-de se is not linguistically marked, in
the sense that there are no structures that unambiguously express impersonal-de se
imagination reports.
18This dispute parallels one in the philosophy of language literature between neo-
Russellians like Salmon (1986), who think belief ascriptions quantify over modes of
presentation, and hidden-indexical theorists like Schiffer (1977) and Crimmins (1992),
who think modes of presentation are contextually supplied.
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contextually restricted. The change to the semantics is minor: one need
only add that attitude verbs take as another argument a set of acquaintance
relations. This could be represented in the structure as a variable over such
sets, and the context could be relied on to determine which set gets assigned
to that variable.
Allowing the variable to range over sets of acquaintance relations rather
than over the relations themselves gives us more flexibility. The context
can, but need not, determine one particular acquaintance relation. If the
participants of the conversation do have in mind a particular acquaintance
relation R, the context can assign the singleton set {R} to the variable. If
they have no particular acquaintance relations in mind at all, the context
can assign the set of all acquaintance relations to the variable. If, however,
their intentions and information rule out some, but not all, acquaintance
relations, the set assigned to the variable will contain all and only those
relations not ruled out by their intentions and information. The resulting
ascription will say that one of those relations R is such that the attitude
holder bears R to the res, and believes that the unique thing to which he
bears R is such-and-such.
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Imagination, Sequenced Worlds, and the De Re
Descriptivism about de re attitudes is controversial. Many philosophers
think an agent can have de re thoughts about an object x even if she
doesn’t possess a descriptive concept that uniquely identifies x. Burge
gives this example:
On seeing a man coming from a distance in a swirling fog, we
may plausibly be said to believe of him that he is wearing a
red cap. But we do not see the man well enough to describe
or image him in such way as to individuate him fully. (Burge,
1977, 351 - 352)
If there is one man, I might think of him under the descriptive concept
the man I see in the red cap. But what if there are multiple red-capped
men? I focus on one, but know of no property that picks him out uniquely.
There is a failure of uniqueness: I have some information about the res,
but that information may not uniquely fit one particular object that I am
acquainted with. Maybe if we scrutinize the case further, we will be able to
come up with a descriptive concept which (a) picks out the man in question
uniquely, and (b) is a plausible candidate for the descriptive concept I use
in thinking about the man. But what guarantee is there that every case
will be like this?
Another type of case that poses a prima facie problem for descriptivism:
Ralph sees someone at a bar with a drink in hand. He thinks to himself,
the man with the gin and tonic has a colorful hat. In fact, it is a woman
drinking sparkling water (cf. Donnellan, 1966). Despite the fact that that
woman does not satisfy Ralph’s descriptive concept, it seems plausible to
say that Ralph has a de re belief about her, a judgment that appears
to conflict with descriptivism. Again, maybe Ralph possesses a ‘fallback’
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descriptive concept which the woman satisfies; but, again, how can we be
sure an agent will always have a fallback descriptive concept which the res
uniquely satisfies? Descriptivism can begin to look like a bold conjecture,
one we have little reason to accept.
These considerations are not decisive. There is a longer debate to be
had, more examples to haggle over. Maybe descriptivism will emerge un-
scathed.1 In the last chapter, we went along with Lewis’s descriptivism
about the de re, showing how we could solve both the problem of counter-
factual attitudes and the problem of the impersonal-de se within a descrip-
tivist framework. But given the controversy surrounding descriptivism, it
would be interesting to see what one should say about the de re if one
accepts Lewis’s view of the de se but rejects descriptivism.
This chapter shows how Lewis’s account of the de se can be generalized
to give a non-descriptivist account of the de re. On Lewis’s account of
the de se, we stipulate that the center represents the agent in any one of
the agent’s centered belief worlds. I show how to extend this ‘method of
stipulation’ to de re attitudes. The resulting account solves the problem
of counterfactual attitudes and the problem of the impersonal-de se, and
yields a non-descriptivist account of de re attitude ascriptions.
3.1 Identification and stipulation
Let me rely for the moment on our pre-theoretic understanding of the
terms ‘possible situation’ and ‘doxastic alternative’ (a doxastic alternative
is just a possible situation compatible with what someone believes). Thus
we leave it open for the time being whether possible situations ought to
be understood as possible worlds, or as centered worlds, or as something
else. One of the main points of this section concerns how non-descriptivists
about the de re should understand the notion of a doxastic alternative.
When Ralph has a de re belief about Ortcutt in virtue of bearing R
to him, each of Ralph’s doxastic alternatives s contains someone who rep-
resents Ortcutt. The question of ‘de re identification’ is this: how do we
identify the individual in s who represents Ortcutt.2 Lewis’s descriptivist
account of the de re offers an answer to this question: s is a centered world,
and the individual y in s who represents Ortcutt is the one to whom the
1For a recent defense of (what I am calling) descriptivism against similar objections,
see Chalmers (2002a,b).
2Hintikka (1969, 1975) first raised this sort of question – the question of ‘cross-
identification’ – in the context of possible worlds semantics.
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center bears R uniquely. If descriptivism is rejected then we must find a
different answer to the question of de re identification.
The Naive Theory also offers an answer to this question: the one who
represents Ortcutt in one of Ralph’s doxastic alternatives is Ortcutt him-
self. But we’ve already seen reasons for rejecting the Naive Theory: it
cannot handle the puzzles about identity, and it runs into a problem con-
cerning the essential properties of the res (see §2.1).3 If both descriptivism
and the Naive Theory are rejected, how are we to answer the question of
de re identification? I think an answer to that question can be found if we
look more closely at how Lewis answers the corresponding question of ‘de
se identification’. When Ralph has a de se belief about himself, each of his
doxastic alternatives s contains an individual who represents Ralph. The
question of de se identification is: how do we identify the individual in s
who represents Ralph?
Lewis’s answer goes something like this: s is a centered world 〈w, x〉,
and x is its center. It is, I think, an implicit stipulation of Lewis’s account
that the center of a centered world represents the attitude holder in that
centered world.4 The centered worlds strategy seems to consist of two
parts: (i) individuating possibilities more finely: doxastic possibilities are
now individuals-at-possible-worlds, rather than merely possible worlds; and
(ii) an implicit stipulation that, when we consider a centered world as a
candidate doxastic alternative for some agent x, the center of that centered
world represents x.
Let me explain (ii): any centered world 〈w, x〉 is a candidate doxastic
alternative for me, in the sense that it is the sort of thing we can assess for
compatibility with my belief state. When we are assessing whether 〈w, x〉
is compatible with my belief state, we check to see whether x in w has all
the properties I attribute to myself. If it does, then it’s compatible with
what I believe; if it doesn’t, then it’s not. That’s the sense in which the
center of a centered world represents me in that centered world, when we’re
assessing that centered world for compatibility with my belief state. (When
we assess a centered world for compatibility with Ralph’s belief state, we
3What about a counterpart-theoretic variation of the Naive Theory, one on which
the one who represents Ortcutt in a doxastic alternative is a metaphysical counterpart
of Ortcutt? This avoids one of the problems that faced the Naive Theory, since Ortcutt
could have more than one counterpart in one of Ralph’s doxastic alternatives, but it won’t
help with the problem of essential properties, since Ortcutt’s metaphysical counterparts
share all his essential properties (cf. Lewis, 1981).
4See the discussion of ‘finding the subject by stipulation’ in Lewis (1983a). (Talk of
stipulation is more prominent in Lewis (1983a) than in Lewis (1979).)
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understand the center as representing Ralph in that centered world. The
generalization is that when we assess a centered world for compatibility
with an agent’s belief state, the center represents the agent.)
But note that we can quite easily extend this same strategy to my de
re beliefs about others. Suppose for simplicity that I only have beliefs
about one other individual, call him “Sam”. In that case, in every possible
situation s compatible with what I believe, there will be an individual
who represents me, and an individual who represents Sam. (Assuming
I believe that I am not Sam, these individuals will be distinct.) How
should we represent these possible situations? Taking our cue from the
centered worlds strategy, we could (i) individuate possibilities still more
finely: a doxastic possibility will now be a pair of a possible world w and
a pair of individuals who inhabit w, rather than merely a centered world;
and (ii) stipulate that, when we consider an object like 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 as a
candidate doxastic alternative for me, x represents me in 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉, and y
represents Sam in 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉. Point (i) tells us to represent my candidate
doxastic alternatives using objects of a certain sort. Point (ii) tells us how
to understand what these objects are being used to represent.
I’ll say more momentarily about how to generalize point (ii), but let
me first try to give you an intuitive feel for the underlying idea. Call a
pair consisting of a possible world and a pair of individuals in that world
a sequenced world (a pair is a sequence of length two).5 Any sequenced
world is a candidate for being one of my doxastic alternatives: it is the
sort of thing we can assess for compatibility with my belief state. What
does it take for a sequenced world to be compatible with what I believe?
In our toy example in which I only have beliefs about myself and Sam, a
sequenced world 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 will be compatible with what I believe iff:
• x in w has all the properties that I attribute to myself;
• y in w has all the properties I attribute to Sam; and
• y and x in w stand in all the relations that I believe that Sam and I
stand in.
(Remember we are stipulating that x represents me, and that y represents
Sam.) So, for example, if I believe:
• that I am small;
5I owe the term sequenced world to Seth Yalcin.
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• that Sam is big; and
• that Sam and I are friends
then all the sequenced worlds 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 compatible with what I believe
will be such that:
• x is small in w;
• y is big in w; and
• y and x are friends in w
The ‘representing individual’ in a doxastic alternative always has all the
properties that the agent attributes to the corresponding ‘represented in-
dividual’.
Another way of explicating our proposal uses the metaphor of self-
location (Lewis, 1979). On Lewis’s account of the de se, believing some-
thing is locating oneself somewhere in the space of possible individuals. If
I believe that I’m a philosopher, I locate myself in the set of possible indi-
viduals who are philosophers: I believe that I am one of the people in that
set. Our suggestion is that, in addition to self-location, there is something
that deserves the name ‘other-location’. When I believe something and
about Sam and myself, I am locating both of us in the space of possible
individuals. Better: I am locating the pair consisting of me and Sam in
the space of pairs of possible individuals (where the members of the pairs
are world-mates). I am self-and-other-locating, or self-and-Sam-locating. If
I believe that Sam and I are friends, then I locate 〈Dilip, Sam〉 in the set of
pairs of possible individuals who are friends. If I believe that I am hungry
and Sam is thirsty, I locate 〈Dilip, Sam〉 in the set of pairs of possible indi-
viduals whose first member is hungry and whose second member is thirsty.
I believe that 〈Dilip, Sam〉 is in that set.
The language of self- and other-location can be translated into the lan-
guage of doxastic compatibility. A centered world is a way of representing
a possible individual; so Lewis:
...centered worlds are not just worlds, just as stuffed cabbage
is not just cabbage; centered worlds amount to presentations
of possible individuals, so a proposal to use centered worlds
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differs little from my proposal to use the individuals themselves.
(Lewis, 1983a, n. 18)6
If centered worlds are ‘presentations of possible individuals’, then when I
self-locate, we can say that what I’m doing is locating the centered world
〈actual world, Dilip〉 in a set of centered worlds. A centered world 〈w, x〉
is compatible with what I believe in the actual world just in case I locate
〈actual world, Dilip〉 in a set containing 〈w, x〉: my beliefs don’t rule out
the possibility that I am x in w, and so 〈w, x〉 represents a way I might be.
Similarly, a sequenced world is way of representing a pair of possible
individuals. So, on our proposal, when I believe something, I locate 〈actual
world, 〈Dilip, Sam〉〉 in a set of sequenced worlds. A sequenced world
〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 is compatible with what I believe in the actual world just in
case I locate 〈actual world, 〈Dilip, Sam〉〉 in a set containing 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉:
my beliefs don’t rule out the possibility that I am x in w and Sam is y in
w, and so 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 represents a way me and Sam might be.7
Talk of pair-location encourages us to make our stipulation about who
x and y represent in 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 more explicit: it is me and Sam who I am
locating. Thus, in our simple example, instead of talking about what it
is for a sequenced world 〈w〈x, y〉〉 to be compatible with what I believe
simpliciter, we should talk about what it is for a sequenced world to be
compatible with what I believe in the actual world about 〈Dilip, Sam〉.
When we assess whether 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 is compatible with what I believe in
the actual world about 〈Dilip, Sam〉, we understand x as representing Dilip
and y as representing Sam (the nth member of 〈x, y〉 represents the nth
member of 〈Dilip, Sam〉). This will be more important to keep in mind
when we move to sequences of greater length.
The content of my belief that Sam is big can be represented by the
following object:
〈〈actual world, 〈Dilip, Sam〉〉, {〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 : y is big in w}〉
6In order to use individuals instead of centered worlds (world-individual pairs), one
needs counterpart theory’s metaphysic of world-bound individuals (for then an individual
determines a possible world). In a system with strict identity across worlds, individuals
alone will not suffice. For suppose I believe that I am resilient. Now consider the question:
is the individual Hillary Clinton compatible with what I believe? In a system of strict
identity, there’s no answering this question, since Hillary is resilient in some worlds, not
so in others, i.e. Hillary-at-w is, Hillary-at-w′ isn’t. Thus the need for centered worlds
(individuals-at-worlds), rather than mere individuals.
7Forgive the ‘me and Sam’ locution, but ‘Sam and I’ would be misleading in this
context and ‘I and Sam’ sounds awful.
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Here, a content is understood to be a pair that consists of a sequenced world
and a set of sequenced worlds.8 Note that the first member of the pair is
maximal in the sense that it is a sequenced world whose second member
contains all and only those individuals I have beliefs about (namely Dilip
and Sam). If p is a set of sequenced worlds, to say that 〈〈w, 〈Dilip, Sam〉〉, p〉
is the content of my belief is to say that all the sequenced worlds compatible
with what I believe in w about 〈Dilip, Sam〉 are contained in p (I locate
〈w, 〈Dilip, Sam〉〉 in p). If I believe 〈〈w, 〈Dilip, Sam〉〉, p〉, then my belief is
true iff 〈w, 〈Dilip, Sam〉〉 ∈ p.9
Continuing with our toy example, we can offer this preliminary account
of de re belief:
Dilip believes (de re) in w that Sam is F iff
i. there is an acquaintance relation R such that Dilip bears
R to Sam in w; and
ii. all the sequenced worlds 〈w′, 〈x′, y′〉〉 compatible with what
Dilip believes in w about 〈Dilip, Sam〉 are such that y′ is
F in w′.
Let us call 〈Dilip, Sam〉 a res sequence for me in w: it is a sequence that
contains all and only the individuals I have beliefs about in w, a sequence
of all and only the individuals I am locating in the space of sequences of
possible individuals.
8Since sets of sequenced worlds are essentially relations, contents are a kind of struc-
tured proposition, not too distant from the sort of contents favored by many philosophers
of language (see King (2006) for an overview).
9In his unpublished Locke Lectures on self-locating belief, Robert Stalnaker takes the
content of a de se belief to be a pair consisting of a centered world and a set of centered
worlds, where the first member of the pair is the centered world that correctly locates
the agent. Our proposal bears affinities to Stalnaker’s idea. See also the distinction in
Recanati (2007b) between the explicit content of a thought and its associated Austinian
proposition. In our system, what we are calling the content of a belief would be the Aus-
tinian proposition; the associated set of sequenced worlds would be the explicit content.
An Austinian proposition has a truth value simpliciter, i.e. not relative to anything, not
even a possible world.
If we adopted Recanati’s distinction, we might end up with a non-descriptivist notion
of narrow content ; narrow contents in our system would be sets of sequenced worlds, and
they would have truth values relative to a sequenced world. (In order for this to be a
genuine notion of a narrow content, we might have to extend this proposal to properties
as well as individuals.) I hope to explore these ideas in future work. (Thanks to Seth
Yalcin for pressing me to think about what the contents of belief should be on this
account.)
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This account avoids descriptivism because we do not use a descriptive
concept to help us find the individual who represents the res in a doxastic
alternative: we find the res’s representative by stipulation. One way to
put this is that if we’re just given a centered world 〈w, x〉, and told that
it is compatible with what I believe about myself, we cannot necessarily
recover a sequenced world 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 from it, because the individual y who
represents Sam in one of my doxastic alternatives need not be ‘obtainable’
as function of w and x. This reflects the fact that I might not be thinking
of Sam under some descriptive concept the G, and so my belief state might
fail to determine a function from centered worlds to representatives of Sam.
One question that one might have about our proposal is this: what
makes it the case that y in 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 represents Sam when we assess
whether that sequenced world is compatible with what I believe about
〈Dilip, Sam〉? In essence, no substantive answer to this question can be
given: we have stipulated that y represents Sam in 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 when we
are assessing whether that sequenced world is compatible with what I be-
lieve about 〈Dilip, Sam〉. Compare the question: what makes it the case
that the center of a centered world represents Dilip when we are assessing
whether that centered world is compatible with what Dilip believes? Here,
too, it seems as if no substantive answer can be given.
Assuming the method of stipulation is legitimate in the de se case, is
it also legitimate in the de re case? One might think the two cases are
different in virtue of the fact that de se and third-personal de re thought
are fundamentally different in certain respects. It is widely believed that
de se thought is in some ways distinctive, and that it differs from ordinary
third-personal de re thought in important ways. After all, isn’t that what
Perry, Lewis, and others showed when they showed that de se thoughts
are irreducibly indexical? I do think there is something distinctive about
the de se, though it can be tricky to say just what this is (it seems to have
something to do with the distinctive role of de se thought in the explanation
of action).10 But what is not at all clear is why the distinctiveness of the
de se makes the method of stipulation legitimate in the de se case, but not
in the de re case. What, exactly, is the connection between the distinctive
nature of de se thought and the method of stipulation?
This isn’t meant as a criticism of Lewis’s treatment of the de se. But
the best argument for his account is not that it captures the distinctiveness
of the de se. In my view, the best argument for his account is simply that
10I think that reading Perry (1977, 1979) is the best way to get a sense of the distinc-
tiveness of the de se.
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it gives us an elegant representation of de se thought, one which, being a
generalization of the familiar possible worlds treatment of attitudes, makes
it easier to see how to theorize about the de se in other domains, like formal
semantics (as we have seen) and decision theory (e.g. in thinking about
the Sleeping Beauty problem). But these reasons for being interested in
Lewis’s account of the de se do not suggest that that account cannot be
fruitfully generalized into a theory of the de re.
So we have not, I think, been given a reason to refrain from using the
method of stipulation when theorizing about the de re. Thus, we press on
with the task of developing our sequenced worlds account of de re attitudes.
3.2 Identity puzzles and acquaintance relations
Two of the main advantages of Lewis’s descriptivist account of the de
re over the Naive Theory are its ability to treat the familiar puzzles of
identity confusion, and its ability to better represent beliefs about essential
properties. Here we show that our anti-descriptivist alternative to Lewis’s
account can also do this work.
Let me start with essential properties. Suppose Ortcutt has DNA se-
quence d, and has that sequence essentially. Nevertheless, Ralph might
not have any opinions about Ortcutt’s DNA sequence. Our account can
easily represent this because there is no requirement that the individual
who represents Ortcutt in one of Ralph’s doxastic alternatives be Ortcutt
himself or a metaphysical counterpart of Ortcutt. On our account, some of
the 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 compatible with what Ralph believes about 〈Ralph, Ortcutt〉
are such that y has DNA sequence d in w, and some of the 〈w′, 〈x′, y′〉〉
compatible with what Ralph believes about 〈Ralph, Ortcutt〉 are such that
y′ doesn’t have DNA sequence d in w′.11 (Note that y and y′ are allowed
to be distinct.) So our account avoids this sort of worry involving essential
properties.12
Cases of identity confusion – the Ortcutt case, the Lingens case – show
11Pretend that Ralph only has beliefs about himself and Ortcutt.
12However, both my account and Lewis’s descriptivist account might face a limitation
in this vicinity. For neither account can accommodate cases in which Ralph believes that
Ortcutt has property F and property G, where F and G are necessarily incompatible in
the sense that no individual has both in a single possible world. An example might be
something like this: Ralph thinks that Ortcutt is both a human and a robot, not realizing
that nothing can be both. But then no possible individual has all the properties Ralph
attributes to Ortcutt. I do not know how to solve this problem, and so leave it for future
discussion.
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that a single actual individual may correspond to two different individuals
in one of the agent’s doxastic alternatives, for the agent may think ‘one is
two’. But so far in our development of the sequenced worlds account, we
haven’t made any allowances for this. Remedying this is not difficult, but
it does require us to revise our account slightly.
Consider the Ortcutt case. In giving a description of that case, it is
normal to say something like this:
Ralph is acquainted with Ortcutt in two different ways: he sees
Ortcutt giving a rousing speech on the stump, and he later sees
Ortcutt sneaking around in a trenchcoat. He doesn’t realize
that the man giving the speech is the man sneaking around in
a trenchcoat. In virtue of being acquainted with Ortcutt in
the ‘speech’ way, he believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. But
in virtue of being acquainted with Ortcutt in the ‘trenchcoat’
way, he believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
The idea here is that Ralph doesn’t just believe things about Ortcutt sim-
pliciter ; he always believes them relative to some acquaintance relation or
other. If you reflect on the example, this notion is intuitive: when Ralph
sees Ortcutt sneaking around in a trenchcoat and thinks that guy is a spy,
we can say that he believes that Ortcutt is a spy, relative to the relation
x bears to y just in case x sees y sneaking around in a trenchcoat. When
Ralph sees Ortcutt giving a speech on the stump and thinks he’s no spy,
we can say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy, relative to the
relation x bears to y just in case x sees y giving a speech on the stump.
The notion of believing something relative to an acquaintance relation is
easy to understand, if difficult to analyze.
In specifying the content of Ralph’s belief state, I propose to use lo-
cutions like ‘Ralph believes that Ortcutt is F , relative to acquaintance
relation R’. I will depend on our intuitive understanding of that way of
speaking. And I will abbreviate that sort of claim by saying things like
‘Ralph believes that Ortcutt-R is F .’ But don’t take ‘Ortcutt-R’ to de-
note some sort of spooky entity; it merely helps to abbreviate the longer
locution.
Let ‘Rs’ denote the relation of acquaintance Ralph bears to Ortcutt
when Ralph hears Ortcutt deliver the rousing speech, and let ‘Rt’ denote
the relation of acquaintance Ralph bears to Ortcutt when Ralph sees Ort-
cutt sneaking around in a trenchcoat. Suppose for simplicity that Ortcutt
only has beliefs about himself, about Ortcutt-Rs, and about Ortcutt-Rt.
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That is, suppose there are only three ‘vivid characters’ in Ralph’s ‘inner
story’ (cf. Kaplan, 1968), one of whom corresponds to Ralph, two of whom
correspond to Ortcutt. In that case, in order to represent Ralph’s doxastic
alternatives, we must use sequenced worlds with sequences of length three,
rather than sequenced worlds with sequences of length two (which is what
we’ve been using up until now). To characterize Ralph’s beliefs we can say
that a sequence world 〈w, 〈x, y, z〉〉 is compatible with what Ralph believes
about 〈Ralph, Ortcutt, Ortcutt〉 only if:
• y gave a rousing speech in w;
• y is not a spy in w;
• z sneaks around in a trenchcoat in w; and
• z is a spy in w.
Note that in this specification of what 〈w, 〈x, y, z〉〉 must be like in
order to be compatible with what Ralph believes about 〈Ralph, Ortcutt,
Ortcutt〉, we let the second member of the sequence y represent what Ralph
believes about Ortcutt relative to Rs, and we let the third member of the
sequence z represent what Ralph believes about Ortcutt relative to Rt.
Thus, our specification of what it is for a sequenced world 〈w, 〈x, y, z〉〉
to be compatible with what Ralph believes about 〈Ralph, Ortcutt, Ortcutt〉
has been implicitly relativized to a sequence of acquaintance relations, in
this particular case the sequence is: 〈identity, Rs, Rt〉. (I’ll discuss what the
identity relation is doing in that sequence in a moment.) The sequence of
acquaintance relations tells us which member of the representing sequence
represents what Ralph believes about Ortcutt-Rs (in this case, the second)
and which represents what Ralph believes about Ortcutt-Rt (in this case,
the third). There are two conditions on a sequence of acquaintance relations
if it is to do this job: first, it must be of precisely the same length as
the res sequence 〈Ralph, Ortcutt, Ortcutt〉 (so in this case, it must be of
length three); and second, Ralph must bear the nth acquaintance relation
in 〈identity, Rs, Rt〉 to the nth member of 〈Ralph, Ortcutt, Ortcutt〉. From
now on we will make explicit the role that a sequence of acquaintance
relations is playing in our characterization of doxastic compatibility.13
13Note that relativity to a sequence of acquaintance relations is only really needed
when the same individual appears more than once in the res sequence, i.e. in cases
where the agent thinks one is two.
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Note that a sequenced world compatible with what Ralph believes
about 〈Ralph, Ortcutt, Ortcutt〉 relative to 〈identity, Rs, Rt〉 will not be
compatible with what Ralph believes about 〈Ralph, Ortcutt, Ortcutt〉 rela-
tive to 〈identity, Rt, Rs〉 (note that Rs and Rt are in different places in these
two sequences of acquaintance relations). This is because Ralph believes
different things about Ortcutt-Rs and Ortcutt-Rt. When saying whether
or not a sequenced world is compatible with what Ralph believes about
〈Ralph, Ortcutt, Ortcutt〉, it is arbitrary which of these two sequences of
acquaintance relations we pick: either one will allow to characterize Ralph’s
belief state. In general, any sequence of acquaintance relations will be suit-
able so long as it meets the two conditions specified above: (i) the sequence
of acquaintance relations is the same length as the res sequence 〈Ralph,
Ortcutt, Ortcutt〉, and (ii) Ralph bears the nth acquaintance relation in the
sequence of acquaintance relations to the nth member of 〈Ralph, Ortcutt,
Ortcutt〉.
Let me suggest that we adopt a convention concerning the representa-
tion of de se belief. Our convention is that the agent himself will always
be the first member of the res sequence, and the relation of identity will
always be the first member of the sequence of acquaintance relations. Re-
call Lewis’s idea that de se belief is a de re belief where the relation of
acquaintance is identity (§2.6); we adopt that idea here. So if, in the above
example, Ralph believes (de se) that he will live a long and prosperous life,
then all the sequenced worlds 〈w, 〈x, y, z〉〉 compatible with what Ralph
believes about 〈Ralph, Ortcutt, Ortcutt〉 relative to 〈identity, Rs, Rt〉 will
be such that x leads a long and prosperous life in w.
So the relation of doxastic compatibility now involves four relata: the
agent (or agent-at-world); a sequenced world; a res sequence; and a se-
quence of acquaintance relations. For the example above, we can say that
a sequenced world 〈w, 〈x, y, z〉〉 is compatible with what Ralph believes
about 〈Ralph, Ortcutt, Ortcutt〉 relative to 〈identity, Rs, Rt〉 iff:
• x in w has all the properties Ralph attributes to himself;
• y in w has all the properties Ralph attributes to Ortcutt relative to
Rs;
• z in w has all the properties Ralph attributes to Ortcutt relative to
Rt; and
• x, y, and z in w stand in all the relations that Ralph believes he,
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Ortcutt-Rs, and Ortcutt-Rt stand in.14
We can understand the notion of content as we did before: simply as a
pair of a sequenced world and a set of sequenced worlds. But we now say
that the agent holds a belief with a certain content relative to a sequence
of acquaintance relations. For example, when Ralph believes in w that
Ortcutt-Rt is a spy, the content of Ralph’s belief is:
〈〈w, 〈Ralph, Ortcutt, Ortcutt〉〉, {〈w′, 〈x′, y′, z′〉〉 : z′ is a spy in
w′}〉
and he believes this content relative to 〈identity, Rs, Rt〉. Ralph’s belief is
true just in case 〈w, 〈Ralph, Ortcutt, Ortcutt〉〉 ∈ {〈w,′ 〈x′, y′, z′〉〉 : z′ is a
spy in w′}, i.e. just in case Ortcutt is a spy in w.
Cases where an agent thinks two are one can be given a similar treat-
ment. Recall the Sparky-Barky case of §2.2: I see Sparky run into my office
on Tuesday, and then see Barky run into my office on Friday, and I come to
believe that the two dogs are one, i.e. that Sparky is Barky. For simplicity,
suppose that I only have beliefs about myself and these two dogs. How do
we represent one of my doxastic alternatives? Although there are only two
vivid characters in my inner story, we nevertheless use sequenced worlds of
length three to represent those alternatives. This is so we can represent the
fact that there are in fact two different dogs that I think are one. Here’s
how this works: we can say that a 〈w, 〈x, y, z〉〉 is compatible with what I
believe about 〈Dilip, Sparky, Barky〉 (relative to the appropriate sequence
of acquaintance relations) only if:
• y = z in w; and
• y is a friendly dog in w.
So although we use sequenced worlds of length three, the fact that I think
Sparky is Barky is represented in the theory by the fact that the individual
that represents Sparky is identical to the individual that represents Barky.
De se identity puzzles can be given a parallel treatment. Recall Situ-
ation 4 from §1.3, where amnesiac Lingens is reading The Life of Rudolph
Lingens and becomes convinced that he is not Lingens. Suppose that Lin-
gens only has de se beliefs about himself and ‘third-personal’ de re beliefs
14Here you can see clearly that in order to understand this notion of doxastic com-
patibility, we need to rely on our intuitive understanding of the idea that an agent has
beliefs about a res relative to an acquaintance relation.
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about himself in virtue of bearing the acquaintance relation Rr to himself
(Rr = the relation x bears to y just in case x reads a biography of y),
so that Lingens’s inner story only contains two vivid characters. We can
represent one of Lingens’s doxastic alternatives using a sequenced world of
length two. We can say that a sequenced world 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 is compatible
with what Lingens believes about 〈Lingens, Lingens〉 relative to 〈identity,
Rr〉 only if:
• x is a gentle soul in w; and
• y is a vicious character in w.
Assuming no gentle soul is also a vicious character, it follows from the
above that x 6= y in w, which reflects the fact that Lingens believes he is
not Lingens-Rr.
3.3 Generalizing the theory
So far, we’ve been discussing toy cases in which an agent only has beliefs
about himself and one or two other individuals. But of course in any
realistic case, an agent will have beliefs abut many more individuals. The
extension of our theory to such cases is straightforward.
A sequenced world can now be taken to be a pair consisting of a world
and a sequence of n individuals. Let ‘xN ’ denote the sequence 〈x1, .., xn〉,
and similarly for ‘yN ’, ‘x′N ’, and so on. Suppose an agent x has beliefs
about n individuals in w. The pair 〈yN , RN 〉 is an acquaintance pair for x
in w iff:
• yN is a res sequence for x in w, i.e. it is a sequence consisting of
all and only those individuals that x is acquainted with in w, and
y1 = x;
• for all m ≤ n, x bears Rm to ym in w, and R1 is the identity relation.
If 〈yN , RN 〉 is an acquaintance pair for x in w, then a sequenced world
〈w′, y′N 〉 is compatible with what an agent x believes in w about yN relative
to RN iff the y′i stand in every n-ary relation R that x believes the yi-Ri
stand in. (Recall our earlier explanation of abbreviations like ‘Ortcutt-R’.)
Note that since any m-ary relation (m ≤ n) can be represented as an n-ary
relation, this gloss on the notion of compatibility should suffice.
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The content of a belief is a pair 〈〈w, yN 〉, p〉 of a sequenced world and
a set of sequenced worlds, where w is the world of the agent who holds the
belief (that agent being y1), yN is a res sequence for y1 in w, and p is a
set of sequenced worlds. Contents are believed relative to a sequence of
acquaintance relations. If 〈yN , RN 〉 is an acquaintance pair for y1 in w, then
y1 believes 〈〈w, yN 〉, p〉 relative to RN iff all the sequenced worlds 〈w′, y′N 〉
compatible with what y1 believes in w relative to RN are contained in p, i.e.
y1 locates 〈w, yN 〉 in p. If an agent has a belief with content 〈〈w, yN 〉, p〉,
that belief will be true just in case 〈w, yN 〉 ∈ p.
We can give a more precise account of de re belief now. The account
goes like this:
Sequenced De Re Belief
x believes (de re) in w that z is F iff for any acquaintance pair
〈yN , RN 〉 for x in w, there is an m ≤ n such that ym = z, and
every sequenced world 〈w′, y′N 〉 compatible with what x believes
in w about yN relative to RN is such that y′m is F in w′
Note that if 〈yN , RN 〉 is an acquaintance pair for x in w, and there is an
m ≤ n such that ym = z, it follows (by the definition of an acquaintance
pair) that x bears Rm to z in w. Thus, it follows that x has a de re belief
about z in w only if x is acquainted with z in w. Note also that, on this
account, de se belief comes out as a special case of de re belief: where the
res is the agent, and the acquaintance relation is identity.
3.4 Imagining and sequenced worlds
So far we have only discussed the sequenced worlds account of de se and de
re belief. But what about counterfactual attitudes like imagining? How are
they to be treated in this framework? The treatment of ‘third-personal’
de re imagining is straightforward, and requires no amendments to the
above account: we simply take our sequenced worlds account of belief and
replace the word believes with the word imagines. The resulting theory has
no trouble with third-personal de re imaginings.
Consider one of the cases that was a problem for General Lewis (§2.3):
Ralph imagines that he is not acquainted with Ortcutt. Let R be the
acquaintance relation Ralph bears to Ortcutt, and let’s suppose that that
Ralph is imagining a situation in which only he and Ortcutt exist, but are
not acquainted with one another. On our account, this means that all the
sequenced worlds 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 compatible with what Ralph imagines about
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〈Ralph, Ortcutt〉 relative to 〈identity, R〉 are such that x is not acquainted
with y in w. And there are certainly sequenced worlds that meet that
condition, so the content of the imagining will not be empty.
The problem of counterfactual attitudes arose for General Lewis because
on that theory, one identifies Ortcutt’s representative in one of Ralph’s
imagination alternatives via the acquaintance relation that the center of
the alternative bears to that representative. And that means that the
theory cannot handle cases in which Ralph imagines not being acquainted
with Ortcutt. But the sequenced worlds account has a different method
of picking out the individual who represents Ortcutt in one of Ralph’s
imagination alternatives: the method of stipulation. We don’t require that
a sequenced world 〈w, 〈x, y〉〉 must be such that x is acquainted with y
in w in order for it to be compatible with what Ralph imagines about
〈Ralph, Ortcutt〉. So there is no trouble characterizing the content of de
re imaginings on the sequenced worlds account.
What about de se imaginings? How does the sequenced worlds account
help with the problem of the impersonal-de se? There is a prima facie dif-
ficulty here. As the theory has been developed thus far, we only have one
‘center’: the first member of the sequence in a sequenced world is always
stipulated to represent the agent relative to the relation of identity. But
in order to solve the problem of the impersonal-de se, we need two cen-
ters. To get around this, we can add another ‘center’ to the imagination-
alternatives, and stipulate that one center is the ‘inside center’ and one
the ‘impersonal-de se center’. The idea would be to understand imagina-
tion alternatives as triples 〈w, x, yN 〉, with x the inside center and y1 the
impersonal-de se center.15
On the envisioned account, when I imagine that I am Brigitte Bardot
and that I am kissing me, the content of my imagining is:
〈〈actual world, 〈Dilip, Bardot〉〉, {〈w, x, 〈y1, y2〉〉 : x is y2 in w
and x is kissing y1 in w}〉
On this account, impersonal-de se imagining will count as a species of de
re imagining about oneself where the relation of acquaintance is identity.
15Instead of the ‘extra center’ approach, we could have gone two-dimensional here as
well. This time we would have used functions from sequenced belief worlds to centered
propositions, rather that two-dimensional centered intensions, to help characterize the
content of an imagining. But this strikes me as a less attractive proposal than the one
I’m about to offer, in part because here the two-dimensional move is not needed in order
to characterize the contents of third-personal de re imaginings.
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But on this account, inside imagining is not a kind of de re imagining at
all, since the inside center x does not represent anyone in the res sequence.
This feature of the theory might seem odd: after all, when I imag-
ine something from the inside, am I not imagining something about me?
Shouldn’t such imaginings thus count as de re imaginings about myself?
That might seem right, but not everyone agrees with this claim: several
philosophers have claimed that when I imagine something from the inside
I am not (or not necessarily) imagining anything about the person I in
fact am. For example, when I imagine from the inside being Napoleon, my
imagining is not in any sense ‘about’ Dilip. Here is David Velleman:
If my approach to imagining that I am Napoleon... is to imag-
ine being Napoleon, then I simply imagine a particular expe-
rience as experienced by Napoleon. I imagine the landscape
as seen through Napoleon’s eyes, the sounds of battle as heard
through his ears, the nap of a tunic as felt by his hand. Al-
though Napoleon doesn’t appear in the resulting mental image,
he does appear in the content of my imagining, since I am imag-
ining Austerlitz as experienced by him. But I, David Velleman,
am absent both from the image and from the content of the
imagining: I’m not imagining anything about the person who
I actually am. (Velleman, 1996, 40)
Williams (1966, 40-45) and Reynolds (1989) reach similar conclusions. This
(admittedly somewhat elusive) feature of imagining from the inside is re-
flected to some extent in our theory, since, according to it, the inside center
does not represent anyone in the agent’s res sequence.
Using the appropriate notions of ‘interesting’ and ‘boring’ sequenced
propositions (sets of sequenced worlds), we can characterize outside, inside,
and impersonal-de se imaginings. I trust the reader can see how to extend
the boring-interesting technique of §1.2.1 and §2.5 to this theory as well,
and so I will not go through that exercise here.
3.5 Attitude ascription again
The semantics that accompanies the sequenced worlds account differs only
minimally from the semantics of §2.6. We retain the same basic semantic
framework of §1.2, as well as the account of de se ascription developed
there.
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Let’s recall what we want the truth conditions of a de re belief ascription
to be. Consider:
(9) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
This should be true at a world w just in case any acquaintance pair
〈yN , RN 〉 for Ralph in w is such that there is an m ≤ n such that ym =
Ortcutt, and every sequenced world 〈w′, y′N 〉 compatible with what Ralph
believes in w about yN relative to RN is such that y′m is a spy in w′.
To derive this result, let us keep the LF of (9) that we had earlier in
§2.6:
(10) Ralph [[believes Ortcutt] [λ1 λ2 t2 is a spy]]
And let us adopt the following lexical entry for believes:
JbelievesKc,i,g = λrese.λp〈s,〈e,et〉〉.λatte. for any acquaintance pair
〈yN , RN 〉 for att in wi, there is an m ≤ n such that ym = res,
and every sequenced world 〈w′, y′N 〉 compatible with what att
believes in wi about yN relative toRN is such that p(w′)(y′1)(y′m) =
1.16
With those assumptions in place, we compute the truth conditions of (9)
as follows:
JRalph believes Ortcutt λ1 λ2 t2 is a spyKc,i,g = 1 iff
For any acquaintance pair 〈yN , RN 〉 for Ralph in wi, there is anm ≤ n
such that ym = Ortcutt, and every sequenced world 〈w′, y′N 〉 compat-
ible with what Ralph believes in wi about yN relative to RN is such
that λw.Jλ1 λ2 t2 is a spyKc,w,g(w′)(y′1)(y′m) = 1 iff
For any acquaintance pair 〈yN , RN 〉 for Ralph in wi, there is anm ≤ n
such that ym = Ortcutt, and every sequenced world 〈w′, y′N 〉 compat-
ible with what Ralph believes in wi about yN relative to RN is such
that y′m is a spy in w′.
16Note that we’re universally quantifying over acquaintance pairs. Alternatively, we
could have had the model specify a unique acquaintance pair for each agent x at world
w. Nothing seems to hinge on this choice.
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Let me also sketch a lexical entry for imagines. The difference between
the entry for imagines and the one for believes is minor: the only difference
is in the sort of sequenced world quantified over. In the case of imagines,
sequenced worlds have an extra center, and so sequenced worlds are triples
rather than pairs. Here is the entry:
JimaginesKc,i,g = λrese.λp〈s,〈e,et〉〉.λatte. for any acquaintance
pair 〈yN , RN 〉 for att in wi, there is an m ≤ n such that ym =
res, and every sequenced world 〈w′, x′, y′N 〉 compatible with
what att imagines in wi about yN relative to RN is such that
p(w′)(x′)(y′m) = 1.
It is easy to confirm that this account has no problem with counterfac-
tual attitude ascriptions like (11):
(11) Ralph imagined that he had never been acquainted with Ortcutt.
As before, the structure of this sentence is:
Ralph [[imagined Ortcutt] [λ1 λ2 he1 had never been acquainted
with t2]]
And with this structure and lexical entry, we can compute the truth con-
ditions of (11) as follows:
JRalph imagined Ortcutt λ1 λ2 he1 had never been acquainted with
t2Kc,i,g = 1 iff
For any acquaintance pair 〈yN , RN 〉 for Ralph in wi, there is an m ≤
n such that ym = Ortcutt, and every sequenced world 〈w′, x′, yN 〉
compatible with what Ralph imagines in wi about yN relative to
RN is such that λw.Jλ1 λ2 he1 had never been acquainted with
t2Kc,w,g(w′)(x′)(y′m) = 1 iff
For any acquaintance pair 〈yN , RN 〉 for Ralph in wi, there is an m ≤
n such that ym = Ortcutt, and every sequenced world 〈w′, x′, yN 〉
compatible with what Ralph imagines in wi about yN relative to RN
is such that x′ is not acquainted with y′m in w′.
As with the semantics in §2.6, impersonal-de se imaginings are simply a
species of de re imagining, and so are reported by de re imagination reports.
To see this, recall Situation 1 from §1.3: amnesiac Lingens imagines from
the outside that he is skiing down a steep hill. This is an impersonal-de se
imagining. To report this imagining, one might use (12):
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(12) Lingens imagined that he was skiing down a steep hill.
On our semantics, this sentence has two structures: one in which he is
bound by the attitude verb, one in which it is not (cf. §2.6). The former
gives rise to the inside reading, and so is not true in Situation 1. The latter
gives rise to the outside de re reading. Assuming the variable assignment
assigns Lingens to he, then (12) is true at a world w iff:
For any acquaintance pair 〈yN , RN 〉 for Lingens in w, there is
an m ≤ n such that ym = Lingens, and every sequenced world
〈w′, x′, y′N 〉 compatible with what Lingens imagines about yN
relative to RN is such that y′m is skiing down a steep hill in w′.
Note that Lingens impersonally-de se imagines in a world w that he is
skiing down a steep hill iff
For any acquaintance pair 〈yN , RN 〉 for Lingens in w, y1 = Lin-
gens, and every sequenced world 〈w′, x′, y′N 〉 compatible with
what Lingens imagines about yN relative to RN is such that y′1
is skiing down a steep hill in w′.
This means that, if Lingens impersonally-de se imagines skiing down a
steep hill in w, then for any acquaintance pair 〈yN , RN 〉 for Lingens in w,
there will be an m ≤ n that meets the appropriate conditions for (12)’s
truth condition to be satisfied: m = 1. So if Lingens impersonally-de se
imagines that he is skiing down a steep hill, he imagines de re that he is
skiing down a steep hill, and so (the free structure of) (12) is true.
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Chapter 4
Imagination, Possibility, and Personal Identity
The previous three chapters have all dealt with issues concerning how to
represent the content of various kinds of imagining. In this chapter, we
turn our attention to the role of imagination in metaphysical thought ex-
periments, and, in particular, personal identity thought experiments. But
issues of content will re-surface: one of the claims of this chapter is that
being clear about the contents of inside vs. outside imaginings leads us to
a conception of possibility which helps account for some otherwise puzzling
intuitions about personal identity over time.
4.1 Introduction
A familiar divide in the theory of personal identity over time is between
those who think personal identity is essentially a matter of psychological
continuity and those who think it is essentially a matter of bodily conti-
nuity. But proponents of these two views share a common opponent: the
philosopher who thinks that personal identity is a ‘further fact’, something
over and above facts about impersonal continuity relations. The view that
facts about personal identity are metaphysically independent of facts about
continuity is often associated with substance dualism, but it is not imme-
diately clear whether or not the view requires dualism. Following Parfit
(1984), let us call this view, whether dualist or not, the Simple View, and
let us call the view that personal identity is essentially a matter of some
kind of impersonal continuity the Complex View. Since most philosophers
who have thought about the matter take it that personal identity consists
in psychological or bodily or perhaps brain continuity, most philosophers
who have thought about the matter endorse the Complex View.
A natural way to try to characterize the Simple-Complex dispute is
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to understand it as a dispute over whether or not personal identity su-
pervenes on lower-level continuity relations, like psychological, bodily, and
brain continuity. Does fixing all the facts about psychological, bodily, and
brain continuity fix the facts about personal identity? The Complex View
maintains, and the Simple View denies, that personal identity facts are
fixed by continuity facts.
Advocates of the Simple View defend their position by noting that when
one looks at the standard personal identity puzzle cases from the first-
person point of view (or from the inside), it seems that personal identity
does not supervene.1 I think this is right, and I think advocates of the
Complex View have failed to appreciate the significance of this point. But,
as we will see, this is only half the story; for when we look at the same
hypothetical cases from the third-person perspective (or from the outside),
it seems that personal identity does supervene. I think advocates of the
Simple View have failed to appreciate the significance of this point. Note
the puzzle that emerges: from the third-person point of view, personal
identity seems to supervene, but from the first-person point of view, it
seems not to supervene. My aim in this chapter is to examine, and then
solve, this puzzle.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I try to bring
the Simple-Complex dispute into sharper focus; this involves a brief discus-
sion of some background issues in the metaphysics of persistence. In §4.3,
I discuss the puzzle as it arises in the context of two well-known thought
experiments: fission and ‘body-switching’. In §4.4, I develop a picture of
imagination and possibility that I think is needed to solve the puzzle. The
imagination part of the picture will be familiar from Chapter 1. What’s
added here is the suggestion that we take seriously the idea that corre-
sponding to these two forms of imagination are two kinds of metaphysical
possibility, one analyzed (as is familiar) in terms of quantification over
possible worlds, the other – and this is less familiar – in terms of quantifi-
cation over centered worlds (cf. Lewis, 1983a, 1986, §4.4). The upshot is
that personal identity does supervene on continuity, even though there is
a perfectly good and important sense in which settling all the continuity
facts does not settle my future (§§4.5 - 4.6).
1For example, see Chisholm (1969), Swinburne (1984), and Baker (2000) (though
these authors don’t put the point in terms of supervenience).
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4.2 Supervenience
I said that it was natural to to try to characterize the Simple-Complex dis-
pute as a dispute over whether or not personal identity supervenes on lower-
level continuity relations, like psychological, bodily, and brain continuity.
But just how should we state the relevant supervenience thesis? In stat-
ing the supervenience thesis, I’m going to employ the four-dimensionalist’s
language of person stages and temporal parts. Four-dimensionalism (or per-
durantism) is the view that persisting things like persons, rocks, and ships
are four-dimensional objects spread out in time and space, things with
temporal as well as spatial parts (see e.g. Lewis, 1976). Not everyone is
a four-dimensionalist: three-dimensionalists (alternatively: endurantists)
reject the idea that ordinary objects have temporal parts (see e.g. van In-
wagen, 1990). On their view, an object that exists at t is wholly present
at t, with no parts existing at other times.2
Given the controversy between these two camps, it might be nice to
state our supervenience thesis without making it look as though we were
taking sides on this issue. But it will be much easier if we simply help
ourselves to the language of four-dimensionalism for the moment, and then
later return to say something about how these matters would look through
a three-dimensionalist lens. This is easier because four-dimensionalism
allows for a simple and intuitive characterization of the issues at hand.
So I will use the language of four-dimensionalism throughout most of the
chapter, and then return in §4.5.4 to the question of how things look ‘in
3D’.3
Back to supervenience. Let us say that two pairs of possible person
stages 〈x, y〉 in w and 〈x′, y′〉 in w′ are the same with respect to continuity
iff:
• x is psychologically continuous with y in w iff x′ is psychologically
continuous with y′ in w′;
• x is bodily continuous with y in w iff x′ is bodily continuous with y′
in w′;
2For a thorough discussion of how to characterize these two views, see Sider (2001b,
Ch.3).
3A note on terminology: sometimes I use person stage and temporal part to refer
to more-or-less instantaneous ‘slices’ of persons; other times, I use them to refer to
aggregates of instantaneous stages, i.e. ‘thick slices’ of persons. (On the latter usage,
persons are improper temporal parts of themselves.) Context should disambiguate.
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• x is ‘brain continuous’ with y in w iff x′ is ‘brain continuous’ with y′
in w′;
• and so one for each relevant continuity relation.
Then we can state our supervenience thesis as follows.
Supervenience
For all worlds w, w′, and pairs of person stages 〈x, y〉 in w,
〈x′, y′〉 in w′: if x and y in w are the same with respect to
continuity as x′ and y′ in w′ are, then x and y are stages of the
same person in w just in case x′ and y′ are stages of the same
person in w′.
Note that the psychological, bodily, and brain continuity theories of
personal identity all entail Supervenience, which suggests that Supervenience
captures what is common to the various versions of the Complex View. For
example, proponents of the Psychological Continuity Theory argue for the
following criterion of personal identity:
Necessarily, for all x, y: x and y are stages of the same person
just in case x and y are related by the relation of psychological
continuity.4
This theory identifies the personal identity relation with the relation of psy-
chological continuity. The Bodily Continuity Theory, on the other hand,
identifies the personal identity relation with the relation of bodily conti-
nuity. Since both these relations are in the relevant supervenience base,
both theories entail Supervenience. This suggests that it makes sense to
characterize the Complex View as the acceptance of Supervenience, and to
characterize the Simple View as the denial of Supervenience.5
4What is the relation of psychological continuity? Two person stages x and y are
psychologically connected iff x and y have psychological states (beliefs, desires, intentions,
apparent memories, character traits, etc.) which are (a) similar in content, and (b)
causally connected in the right way, i.e. the psychological states of the later person
stage causally depend (in the right way) for their character on the states of the earlier
one (Lewis, 1976, 55-56). Psychological continuity is then the ancestral of psychological
connectedness.
5One problem with characterizing the Simple View as the denial of Supervenience is
that, as Noonan (1989, 96 - 97) notes, most advocates of the Simple View defend a
stronger thesis: they defend the claim that there are no non-trivial necessary conditions
on personal identity. For example, they would deny the claim that, necessarily, x and
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4.3 The puzzle
4.3.1 Fission
Suppose that we could divide my brain, and transplant each hemisphere
into a different body (suppose these bodies are qualitatively identical). And
suppose that the two resulting persons both had beliefs, desires, intentions,
apparent memories, and character traits which were similar to mine. In
short, suppose that both resulting persons were psychologically continuous
with me. This is a fission case, impersonally described.
In the impersonal fission case, most people are inclined to say that the
initial person does not survive fission. The reason for this is that, in order
for the initial person to end up as, say, the left hemisphere person (Lefty),
there would need to be some fact that explained her ending up as Lefty
rather than as the right hemisphere person (Righty).6 But since the initial
person bears exactly the same (qualitative) relations to each of Lefty and
Righty, there can be no such fact. This suggests that the initial person
cannot be Lefty, nor can she be Righty. And since Lefty and Righty are
distinct, the initial person cannot be identical to both Lefty and Righty.
The only option left is that the initial person does not survive.
If this is right, then advocates of the Psychological Continuity Theory
would need to revise their account so it includes a ‘non-branching’ clause.
The relation of non-branching psychological continuity obtains between
two person stages x and y just in case (i) they stand in the relation of
psychological continuity, and (ii) there is no person stage z (z 6= x and
z 6= y) such that one and only one of x and y stands in the relation
of psychological continuity to z.7 Similar revisions could be made to the
Brain and Bodily Continuity Theories. In addition to psychological, bodily,
y are stages of the same person only if x and y have the same body. Thus, there
is a possible intermediate position between the Simple View and the Complex View:
one which denies Supervenience but maintains that there are some non-trivial necessary
conditions on personal identity. As Noonan notes, this view is not popular, and is not
particularly plausible. (This contrasts with the case of trans-world identity where the
analogous position is the standard one.) Like Noonan, I will ignore this intermediate
position: thus, if a consideration speaks in favor of the existence of a non-trivial necessary
condition on personal identity, I take it to speak in favor of Supervenience.
6Note that Lefty and Righty are not names but abbreviations of the definite de-
scriptions the person with the left hemisphere and the person with the right hemisphere
respectively.
7There may be a worry about circularity in this statement of the non-branching
criterion; see Thomson (1997, 214-15) and Brueckner (2005) for discussion.
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and brain continuity, we can now think of Supervenience as including non-
branching versions of those relations in the supervenience base.
If this is our reaction to the impersonally described fission case, then
our reaction seems to support Supervenience.8 For Supervenience leads us to
expect that, once the continuity relations are fixed as they are in the fission
case, there will not be multiple ‘person possibilities’ compatible with our
description of the case. And here we find this expectation met, for once we
fix the continuity facts in the fission case, we seem to see only one person
possibility: the initial person does not survive. If the continuity facts did
not fix the person facts, we might expect there to be three possibilities for
the initial person’s survival: she ends up as Lefty, she ends up as Righty,
or she doesn’t end up at all. That we think the latter is the only possibility
consistent with the specified continuity facts suggests that we think that
once the continuity facts are fixed as they are in the fission case, the relevant
person facts are also fixed.
There is a great deal of literature on the fission case, and not everyone is
happy with the above solution, though I think that solution has some claim
to being the dominant response in the literature. Two other responses are
worth mentioning:
• It is indeterminate whether the initial person survives. (Parfit, 1984)
• There are two persons in a fission case, and they share their birth-
to-fission temporal part. (Lewis, 1976)
The important issue for us is not to decide on which of these three views
is right. The important point for us is to note that all three of these
responses seem to support the idea that fixing the continuity facts fixes
the person facts.9 For none of these views holds that there are multiple
ways things might turn out for the initial person(s). All agree that there
is only one person possibility consistent with the specified continuity facts;
they simply disagree about what that person possibility is. So although it
may not be clear how best to describe the fission case when we consider it
from the third-person perspective, it seems that looking at the case from
8Remember, as I noted earlier (see footnote 5), if a case suggests that there is a
non-trivial necessary condition on personal identity, I take it to support Supervenience.
9Making this point precisely with respect to the indeterminacy-view might require us
to re-formulate Supervenience along the following lines: If two pairs of possible person
stages are the same continuity-wise, then either (i) both pairs are determinately person-
related; (ii) both pairs are determinately not person-related; or (iii) both pairs are such
that it is indeterminate whether or not they are person-related.
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this perspective supports Supervenience. For ease of exposition I will for
the most part simply assume that the first response to the fission case –
according to which the initial person does not survive – is the intuitively
right one, but nothing of substance hangs on this choice. All that really
matters is the claim that our reaction to the impersonally-described fission
case supports Supervenience.
The above case was specified impersonally: even though I stipulated
that it was my brain that was divided, we were not called on to take up
my point of view or that of any of the participants in the case. We could
just have well described the case by saying, Suppose a person’s brain was
divided.... But now consider what happens when we do describe the case
from the point of view of one of the participants, and imagine following
that point of view through time. As several authors have noted, when
we do this, we can imagine surviving fission as either one of the resulting
persons.10 Looked at from the first-person point of view, I can see three
possibilities for my survival: I survive as Lefty, I survive as Righty, I don’t
survive at all.
To see this, let us begin with a case of brain division and transplant
that does not involve fission:
Friday: You have suffered great trauma to your person. The
only part of your body that the surgeons believe can be sal-
vaged is the left hemisphere of your brain. The surgeons de-
cide to attempt to transplant the left hemisphere of your brain
into another body. The procedure is risky, and you are deeply
afraid...
Saturday: Luckily, however, you wake up the next morning,
groggy but thrilled to be alive. The surgeons tell you that
the transplant was a success. You examine your new body,
comparing it favorably with the old one. The surgeons hand
you an ice-filled cooler that contains your right hemisphere.
You think, How strange... this is half my old brain.
Given that we can imagine being in this predicament, it seems that we can
imagine surviving fission simply by ‘adding on’ the existence of a second
person. Instead of simply waking up, this time I wake up and look over at
another person, who I am told has half my old brain:
10For example: Chisholm (1969, 106), Swinburne (1984, 17-19), Blackburn (1997, 181),
and Baker (2000, 137).
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Friday: [As above.]
Saturday: Luckily, however, you wake up the next morning,
groggy but thrilled to be alive. You examine your new body,
comparing it favorably with the old one. The surgeons are
pleased—in fact, they are amazed, for not only did you sur-
vive, but they somehow managed to successfully transplant
your right hemisphere into another body! You catch a glimpse
of another person on the right side of the recovery room. You
think, How strange... He has half of my old brain.
And it seems that one can just as easily imagine winding up as as the
person on the other side of the the recovery room, looking across at the
person on the left side of the room. A third possibility, of course, is that
one can imagine facing the procedure on Friday and then not waking up
as either of the resulting persons. Or at least one can imagine this insofar
as one can imagine dying.
The first-personally presented fission case seems to tell against Super-
venience. For there seem to be three relevant cases, all of which agree on
the continuity relations that obtain between me (the initial person), Lefty,
and Righty, but which differ on which of those stages are stages of the
same person (in one, I end up as Lefty, in other as Righty, in a third, I
end up as no one at all).11 Thus, there seem to be three possibilities for
my persistence which are consistent with the same set of continuity facts.
This seems to tell against Supervenience.
This is our puzzle about fission: when we imagine fission from the
outside, our judgments support Supervenience; when we imagine it from
the inside, our judgments tell against Supervenience.
4.3.2 Williams’s puzzle
We now show how this same phenomenon arises in connection with a dif-
ferent hypothetical case: a case of ‘body-switching’.
Williams (1970) invites us to suppose that there is a device capable
of ‘extracting’ all or most of the information (beliefs, desires, intentions,
apparent memories, character traits, etc.) from a person’s brain. And we
are to suppose that the information can then be ‘re-inserted’ back into the
11The initial person, Lefty, and Righty are all aggregates of person stages. When I
speak of two aggregates of person stages s and s′ being related by a continuity relation
R, understand this as saying that any arbitrary instantaneous slice of s bears R to any
arbitrary instantaneous slice of s′.
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person’s brain. Imagine two persons, A and B, each entering a similar
machine which ‘sucks’ all the psychological information out of their brains
and puts it into the brain which originally belonged (and may still belong)
to the other person, so that, after this procedure, the person in the A-
body (i.e. A’s original body) now has all the memories, thoughts, feelings,
etc. that B had before the procedure. And similarly, A’s psychological
information is now in the B-body (i.e. B’s original body).
The question now is: to whom does each body belong? Does the B-
body still belong to B or does it now belong to A? Williams observes that
most of us are inclined to say that the B-body now belongs to A, and that
the A-body now belongs to B. For the person in the B-body will have all
of A’s apparent memories, and none of B’s. Further, having A’s beliefs,
desires, and character traits, the person in the B-body will tend to act
and talk just as A acted and talked. And, of course, this person will think
that he is A, since he has all of A’s beliefs and apparent memories. All
this suggests that the person in the B-body is A. Similar considerations
suggest that B is the person in the A-body after the experiment.
For these reasons, the case, as Williams notes, seems to be one in which
two people ‘change bodies’. And this seems to show that who a person will
be in the future depends on psychological, rather than on bodily or brain,
continuity. The point I wish to focus on again is that our initial reaction
to this case seems to support Supervenience, since Supervenience leads us
to expect that if we fix the continuity facts in a given situation, then only
one ‘person possibility’ will be compatible with our description of that
situation. If the continuity facts did not fix the person facts, there might
be two possible situations consistent with Williams’s description: one in
which the participants switch bodies, another in which they remain in their
respective bodies. That we think the latter is not a possibility consistent
with the specified continuity facts suggests that we think that once the
continuity facts are fixed in the way Williams fixes them, the relevant
person facts are also fixed.
So far, the case is not a puzzle—it’s simply a case which seems to
support the Psychological Continuity Theory over the Simple View and
other versions of the Complex View. The puzzle is generated by placing
the above description of the case next to a description of the case from
the perspective of one of its participants. My description is adapted from
Williams (1970, 51-52):
Someone in whose power I am tells me that I am going to be
tortured tomorrow. I am frightened, and look forward to to-
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morrow in great apprehension. He adds that when the time
comes, I shall not remember being told that this was going to
happen to me, since shortly before the torture something else
will be done to me which will make me forget the announce-
ment. This certainly will not cheer me up. He then adds that
when the moment of torture comes, I shall not remember any
of the things I am now in a position to remember. This does
not cheer me up either. He now further adds that at the mo-
ment of torture I shall not only not remember the things that I
am now in a position to remember, but will have a different set
of impressions of my past, quite different from the memories I
have now. I do not think that this would cheer me up either.
Nor do I see why I should be put into any better frame of mind
by the person in charge adding that the impressions of my past
with which I shall be equipped on the eve of torture will exactly
fit the past of another person now living. And things would be
no better if, finally, he adds that something will happen to that
other person so that he will wake up tomorrow unable to re-
member the thing things he now remembers, and will instead
be equipped with impressions of my past; and that, far from
being tortured, the other person will receive a substantial re-
ward. Fear, surely, would still be the proper reaction: and not
because one did not know what was going to happen, but be-
cause in one vital respect at least one did know what was going
to happen—torture, which one can indeed expect to happen to
oneself, and to be preceded by certain mental derangements as
well.12
Williams then writes:
If this is right, the whole question seems now to be totally mys-
terious. For what we have just been through is of course merely
one side, differently represented, of the transaction which we
considered before... (Williams, 1970, 52-53)
Williams points out that the main difference between the two presen-
tations is that the first presentation is conducted entirely in third-personal
terms, whereas, in the second presentation, the case is presented from the
12This follows Williams’s text closely, but is not a quotation. I have amended the case
to avoid certain irrelevant complications.
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first-person perspective—it is presented as happening to me. But how does
Williams’s puzzle constitute an instance of our puzzle? So far we’ve only
seen that imagining this case from the first-person perspective tells against
the Psychological Continuity Theory. Since it seems that I would remain
in my body after the procedure in this case, that might be because the
Simple View is true, but it might be because the Bodily or Brain Continu-
ity Theory is true. The latter is what Williams seems to conclude about
this second presentation:
It is often recognized that there are ‘first-personal’ and ‘third-
personal’ aspects of questions about persons, and that there are
difficulties about the relations between them. It is also recog-
nized that ‘mentalistic’ considerations... and considerations of
bodily continuity are involved in questions of personal identity...
It is tempting to think that the two distinctions run parallel:
roughly, that a first-person approach concentrates on mentalis-
tic considerations, while a third-personal approach emphasizes
considerations of bodily continuity. The present discussion is
an illustration of exactly the opposite. (Williams, 1970, 62)
But a third presentation of Williams’s case – one which Williams does
not consider – shows that this conclusion is too quick. Taken together,
the second and third presentations of the case seem to suggest that the
‘first-person approach’ supports the Simple View, not the Bodily or Brain
Continuity Theory (cf. Madell, 1981, 94).
The third presentation of the case is simply one in which the experi-
menter tells me that I will undergo a certain medical procedure which will
result in my waking up tomorrow in a different body, with all my mem-
ories and other psychological states intact.13 The body I will wake up in
tomorrow is the body of another person, and that person will wake up with
my body tomorrow. The experimenter also tells me that tomorrow I will
be tortured, and that the other person will receive a reward. While not
considered by Williams, this third presentation is a type of thought ex-
periment very familiar from the personal identity literature: imagine you
wake up in a different body tomorrow, with all your memories and psy-
chological states intact. Many have used this sort of case to argue for the
Psychological Continuity Theory.14
13I assume, of course, that the medical procedures in all three presentations are exactly
the same.
14For discussion of this sort of case, see Shoemaker (1963) and Thomson (1997, 217-18).
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Taken together, the second and third presentations seem to conflict with
Supervenience. An implicit assumption of the second and third presenta-
tions is that the continuity relations between the relevant person stages are
the same in both cases. Let’s call the body I start out in in both cases the
A-body, and the other relevant body in both cases the B-body. Let ‘preA’
be an abbreviation for the person in the A-body before the procedure, and
let ‘postA’ be an abbreviation for the person in the A-body after the proce-
dure, and define ‘preB’ and ‘postB in an analogous fashion. (Perhaps these
bodies have large scarlet letters painted on them.) So in both cases, preA
(me) and postA are related by bodily and brain, but not psychological,
continuity. But in the second presentation, I end up as postA (I remain
in my body) whereas in the third I do not, since I end up as postB (I go
where my psychology goes). So we have two cases in which preA and postA
are the same with respect to continuity, even though the two cases differ
over whether preA and postA are stages of the same person or not. The
apparent existence of these two possibilities conflicts with Supervenience.
This is our puzzle about Williams’s case: when we imagine the case
from the outside, our judgments support Supervenience, and in particular,
the Psychological Continuity Theory; but when we imagine it from the
inside, our judgments tell against Supervenience.
Note that the majority of commentators on Williams’s puzzle seem to
have missed what it actually shows. Discussions of this case have tended to
follow Williams in taking it to show that we have intuitions that support
the Psychological Continuity Theory, on the one hand, and intuitions that
support the Bodily Continuity Theory, on the other.15 Thus, the case
has been used to argue that our intuitions about personal identity puzzle
cases are unreliable (Rovane, 1998; Szabo´ Gendler, 1998), or that it is
indeterminate which of the Psychological and Bodily Continuity Theories
is true (Sider, 2001a). But as our third presentation shows, Williams’s
puzzle arises not because we’re torn between the Psychological and Bodily
Continuity Theories, but because we’re torn between the Complex View
(in particular, the Psychological Continuity Theory) and the Simple View.
We ought to have been suspicious of Williams’s diagnosis of his puzzle
anyway, since it simply says nothing about why the psychological continuity
intuitions go with the third-personal presentation of the case, or why the
bodily continuity intuitions go with the first-personal presentation of the
case. This, after all, is one of the most striking features of Williams’s puzzle.
The ‘first-person/third-person’ contrast will be integral to our explanation
15Madell (1981) is a notable exception.
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of this puzzle.
4.4 Imagination and possibility
How should we begin our search for a solution to this puzzle? Note that
the conflict is over the number of possibilities for the person facts that
are compatible with a given specification of the continuity facts. When
I imagine these cases from the outside, I see only one ‘person possibility’
consistent with the specified continuity facts, but when I imagine these
cases from the inside, it seems that there are multiple possibilities for my
survival consistent with the specified continuity facts.
Given the abstract structure of the puzzle, what might a solution to it
look like? Here is a suggestion: Maybe these two types of imagining cor-
respond to two different kinds of metaphysical possibility. Perhaps while
only one ‘person possibility1’ is compatible with the specified continuity
facts in a given case, several ‘possibilities2’ for my persistence are compat-
ible with those same continuity facts. And maybe when we look at a case
from the outside we see the possibilities1, and when we look from the inside
we see the possibilities2. Something like that, we might agree, would solve
the puzzle if it were true. But why should we think any like this is true?
What would these two types of possibility even be?
I think that a plausible answer to that question can be had if we consider
the connection between imagination and possibility in light of the account
of the distinction between imagining from the inside and imagining from
the outside that we developed in §§1.1-1.2. Recall that account:
Uncentered Imagination
The content of an imagining from the outside is a set of possible
worlds.
For all imaginings I, I is an imagining from the outside iff I’s content
is a set of possible worlds.
Centered Imagination
The content of an imagining from the inside is a set of centered
worlds.
For all imaginings I, I is an imagining from the inside iff I’s content
is a set of centered worlds.
Before I go on to say something about the connection between this account
of imagination and the nature of possibility, I want to say the following
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about this account. In Chapter 1, I noted that there was a problem for
this account, the problem of the impersonal-de se. And in Chapters 2
and 3, I offered two different solutions to this problem, but the resulting
accounts were more complex than the account repeated above. But the
problematic cases that motivated those more complex accounts only really
arise when one considers how the inside-outside distinction interacts with
de se ignorance. As I said in §1.2.3, in cases where such ignorance is not
at issue, this simple account, Uncentered and Centered Imagination, seems
entirely adequate (compare the fact that it seems fine to take all contents
to be possible worlds propositions when one is not theorizing about the
de se). Since the issues we are investigating here have little to do with
de se ignorance, I think we can ignore some of the complexities discussed
in the earlier chapters, and employ this simple view of the inside-outside
distinction.
On to possibility. Now while there is much discussion in the philo-
sophical literature about the relationship between imaginability and pos-
sibility,16 there is virtually none about what metaphysical consequences
(if any) the inside-outside distinction has. But given our account of this
distinction, an intriguing idea is that each type of imagining is a guide to a
different kind of metaphysical possibility. Perhaps just as there are centered
and uncentered contents, there are centered and uncentered metaphysical
possibilities.
Suppose that, normally, imagining p provides evidence that p is pos-
sible, no matter what kind of content p is. When I imagine p from the
third-person perspective, p is a de dicto content, something that has a
truth value at a possible world. So one might take this imagining as ev-
idence that there is a possible world accessible from the actual world at
which p is true. Here, p is an uncentered possibility, a possible way for
the world to be. But when I imagine p from the first-person perspective,
p is a de se content, something that only has a truth value at a centered
world. So one might take this imagining as evidence that there is a centered
world accessible from 〈actual world, me〉 at which p is true.17 Here, p is a
centered possibility, a possible way for me to be. From the outside, I see
the ways the world could be; from the inside, I see the ways I could be.
Following Lewis (1983a, 1986, §4.4), let us suppose that uncentered and
16For some recent discussion, see the articles in Szabo´ Gendler and Hawthorne (2002).
17The accessibility relation is just a place-holder at the moment; we’ll discuss what it
means shortly.
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centered possibilities are both genuine species of metaphysical possibility.18
Here’s the basic idea:
Uncentered Possibility
Some possibility claims can be analyzed in terms of quantification
over possible worlds.
Centered Possibility
Some possibility claims can be analyzed in terms of quantification
over centered worlds.
Now this distinction is only interesting if these two types of possibility can
come apart, if some claims of the form I could have been F are true in
one sense but not the other. One type of a possibility claim that could
be analyzed as a true centered possibility claim, but which would be false
when analyzed as an uncentered possibility claim, would be a claim like I
could have been Fred, as uttered by someone other than Fred. Here’s how
we would analyze that claim as a centered possibility claim:
I could have been Fred is true as uttered by xc in wc iff there is
a centered world 〈w, x〉 accessible from 〈wc, xc〉 such that x is
Fred in w.19
On the standard possible worlds analysis, that claim would be false when
uttered by anyone other than Fred. Given that I am not Fred, and given
the necessity of distinctness, there is no possible world in which I am Fred,
and so, in the uncentered sense, I could not have been Fred.
18See also Hazen (1979). The Hazen-Lewis proposal is conducted within counterpart
theory. Our account is the centered worlds ‘translation’ of theirs, just as our account
of the de se-de dicto distinction is the centered worlds translation of Lewis (1979). The
centered worlds framework does not require counterpart theory’s metaphysic of world-
bound individuals (cf. §3.1). But on at least one reasonable understanding of the term
counterpart theory (Fara, 2007), our centered possibility proposal counts as a kind of
counterpart theory.
19Note that nothing in our apparatus demands that we think of centered possibility
as an essentially first-personal kind of metaphysical possibility. The above analysis of
centered possibility does not depend on the modal claim’s being expressed with the first-
person singular pronoun I. This can be seen by looking at how we could analyze Dilip
could have been Fred as a centered possibility claim:
Dilip could have been Fred is true at wc iff there is a centered world 〈w, x〉 accessible
from 〈wc, Dilip〉 such that x is Fred in w.
See the Appendix for more on the semantics of centered possibility.
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But as several philosophers have noted, the idea that (as each of us
would put it) I could have been someone else is not without intuitive sup-
port:
...my being TN (or whoever in fact I am) seems accidental... So
far as what I am essentially is concerned, it seems as if I just
happen to be the publicly identifiable person TN—as if what I
really am, this conscious subject, might just as well view the
world from the perspective of a different person. (Nagel, 1986,
60)
Here am I, there goes poor Fred; there but for the grace of God
go I; how lucky I am to be me, not him. Where there is luck
there must be contingency. I am contemplating the possibil-
ity of my being poor Fred, and rejoicing that it is unrealized...
(Lewis, 1983a, 395)
‘I might have been somebody else’ is a very primitive and very
real thought; and it tends to carry with it an idea that one
knows what it would be like for this ‘I’ to look out on a different
world, from a different body, and still be the same ‘I’. (Williams,
1966, 40)
Now you don’t have to accept this idea in order to accept Centered Possi-
bility. But if you’re inclined to accept it – or to at least think it’s coherent
– then our account gives you a way of making sense of this thought.
We arrived at this ‘two kinds of possibility’ proposal by reflecting on
the connection between imagination and possibility. We can now set out
this connection as follows:
Uncentered Guide
Imagining from the outside is a guide to uncentered possibility. If I
can imagine an uncentered content p, that is evidence that there is a
possible world w accessible from the actual world such that p is true
at w.20
20Many philosophers believe: (i) that every possible world is metaphysically accessi-
ble from every other possible world, and (ii) that ‘possible world’ and ‘metaphysically
possible world’ are co-extensive. As a result, these philosophers do not need to mention
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Centered Guide
Imagining from the inside is a guide to centered possibility. If I can
imagine a centered content p, that is evidence that there is a centered
world 〈w, x〉 accessible from 〈actual world, me〉 such that p is true at
〈w, x〉.
One worry about our analysis is that it does not explain the notion of
centered possibility in independently understood terms. What is the rele-
vant accessibility relation here? Metaphysical accessibility, which relates a
possible individual to each of the possible individuals she could have been?
If that is the only answer we can give, as I suspect it is, then the analysis
is to some degree circular. But in this, the centered worlds analysis is not
much different from the possible worlds analysis. Possible worlds semantics
analyzes:
It is possible that Aristotle could have died as a child
as:
There is a possible world (accessible from the actual world) in
which Aristotle died as a child.
But the latter obviously does not explain the former in independently un-
derstood terms. In both cases – centered and uncentered – the ‘analyses’
only serve to clarify the structure of the relevant modal claims.21
A different sort of question about the accessibility relation concerns not
the analysis of the accessibility relation, but its extension: which centered
worlds are accessible from me? Could I have been an aggregate of person
stages that is neither psychologically nor bodily continuous? Could I have
been Napoleon? Could I have been a poached egg?
I do not have any principled way of determining the extension of the
accessibility relation. But I don’t think that our entitlement to appeal to
the notion of centered possibility stands or falls with our ability to precisely
accessibility relations in their analyses of modal claims. But some theorists reject (i)
and/or (ii), in which case the reference to a metaphysical accessibility relation is not
redundant. See, for example, Salmon (1998) and the references therein. Since both
views can be represented in terms of a metaphysical accessibility relation, I formulate
uncentered possibility claims in those terms.
21At any rate, this is the line most actualists take. Lewis, on the other hand, aims to
reduce the modal to the non-modal, and so would reject this as a characterization of his
possible worlds analysis of modality. I side with the actualists here.
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delineate the extension of the accessibility relation. Again, it is instructive
to compare this situation with the case of possible worlds. Few philosophers
would think they know exactly what the space of possible worlds is like.
Are there possible worlds where Adam has all the qualitative properties
Noah has, and vice-versa? Are there possible worlds physically identical
to this one, but in which no one is conscious? Are there possible worlds
almost exactly like this one but in which it rains beer throughout the earth
for fifteen minutes in 1976?
I do not know the answers to these questions. For some of them, I do
not even know how to go about answering them. Despite that, I think
I do know certain possible worlds claims, e.g. that there is a possible
world in which my sister is a school teacher, that there are no possible
worlds in which Barack Obama is a non-human robot, and that no two
possible worlds have exactly the same physical facts but different moral
facts (the moral supervenes on the physical). The legitimacy of using the
possible worlds apparatus to elucidate particular modal claims which one
accepts doesn’t require one to answer every question of the sort “But is
there a possible world in which such-and-such happens?” Similarly, unless
one has an antecedent reason to be skeptical of the notion of centered
possibility, it seems legitimate to use the centered possibility apparatus to
elucidate particular centered possibility claims even if one cannot answer
every question of the sort “Is there a centered world accessible from you
centered on a being like this?”
But let me say this: if we think of imagining from the inside as our
basic way of representing centered possibilities, then it is natural to assume
that accessibility is a relation between centered worlds that are centered
on things that have perspectives or points of view.22 This might be a
necessary condition on the accessibility relation: any centered world 〈w, x〉
accessible from me must be such that x has a ‘perspective’ in w (whatever
that amounts to). Whether this is also a sufficient condition is a question
we can leave unanswered for present purposes. This condition is, of course,
seriously under-specified insofar as we lack an account of what it takes to
have a ‘perspective’. But, at the very least, this view would seem rule
out the possibility that there are centered worlds accessible from me that
are centered on poached eggs or bedposts. This view of accessibility thus
differs from Lewis’s construal, according to which every possible object
is accessible from every other (Lewis, 1986, 239 - 243). I think there are
tradeoffs between these two views: Lewis’s has the advantage of not having
22Thanks to Seth Yalcin for discussion on this matter.
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to explain a restriction, but the disadvantage of alienating the proposal
from the first-personal intuitions that motivate it in the first place.
Two other possible constraints on accessibility that are worth consid-
ering are these:
• Origins: any centered world 〈w, x〉 accessible from me must be such
that x’s origins in w are sufficiently similar to mine.
• Continuity: any centered world 〈w, x〉 accessible from me must be
such that x in w is an aggregate of person stages whose stages are
maximally interrelated by some relatively ‘natural’ continuity rela-
tion (e.g. bodily continuity, branching psychological continuity, non-
branching psychological continuity, etc.).
It’s worth noting that the solution to the puzzle about Supervenience that
I will present shortly will go through even if we adopted these two con-
straints along with the perspective constraint. This would leave us with
a fairly conservative notion of centered possibility, one which would not
countenance the I could have been Fred intuition.
There may be other worries about the idea of centered possibility, wor-
ries which are independent of questions about the analysis and extension of
the accessibility relation. But I think it is legitimate to postpone questions
about the ‘ultimate tenability’ of this proposal, at least for the moment. I
think this is legitimate because whether or not we should adopt Centered
Possibility depends in part on whether doing so would make other philo-
sophical problems more tractable. And in the remainder of the paper I
shall argue that this hypothesis helps us solve at least one problem—our
puzzle about Supervenience.23
23Another question that sometimes comes up is whether it would be better to under-
stand centered possibilities as conceptual, rather than metaphysical, possibilities. This
is a much bigger question that I can hope to deal with here, not least because of the
complexities involved in drawing the conceptual-metaphysical distinction. But here’s
how I view the present project: We come across some possibility judgments whose joint
truth seems to conflict with Supervenience (e.g. I could have undergone fission and sur-
vived as Lefty and I could have undergone fission and survived as Righty). We arrive
at those judgments by imagining the relevant hypothetical cases from the inside. Since
imagining from the inside is imagining a centered content, it is plausible to suppose that
the relevant possibility judgments should also be analyzed in terms of centered worlds.
As I will demonstrate in §4.5, an important benefit of this analysis is that it renders the
joint truth of those judgments compatible with Supervenience.
If this same story can be told while understanding the relevant possibility claims as
conceptual possibility claims, then that would be acceptable to me, though I would like
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4.5 The solution
Suppose we accept the foregoing claims about imagination and possibility.
How does this help solve our puzzle? It turns out that this picture alone
won’t solve the puzzle—we need one more claim about what it is we imagine
being when we imagine these cases from the inside.
4.5.1 One more claim
In §3.2, I noted that some philosophers think that when I imagine from the
inside begin Napoleon, I am not imagining anything about the person I in
fact am, Dilip. I am not imagining the truth of some actually false identity
statement. I repeat the passage from Velleman that I quoted earlier:
If my approach to imagining that I am Napoleon... is to imag-
ine being Napoleon, then I simply imagine a particular expe-
rience as experienced by Napoleon. I imagine the landscape
as seen through Napoleon’s eyes, the sounds of battle as heard
through his ears, the nap of a tunic as felt by his hand. Al-
though Napoleon doesn’t appear in the resulting mental image,
he does appear in the content of my imagining, since I am imag-
ining Austerlitz as experienced by him. But I, David Velleman,
am absent both from the image and from the content of the
imagining: I’m not imagining anything about the person who
I actually am. (Velleman, 1996, 40)
Velleman also connects this point to first-personal personal identity thought
experiments of the sort we’ve been discussing, and it is this connection that
will be crucial for us:
If I can imagine that I am Napoleon without imagining a Napoleonic
identity for myself, then maybe I can anticipate that I will wake
up in the future without anticipating a future for my actual
to learn more about how to draw the conceptual-metaphysical distinction, and why we
should think that centered possibility claims always fall on the conceptual side of the
line. Presumably, we are not always required to offer non-question-begging answers to
questions of the form “how do you know that’s a metaphysical, rather than a conceptual,
possibility?”. For if we are always subject to that requirement, I can’t see how skepticism
about what’s metaphysically possible is to be avoided. For how do you defend, e.g., the
claim that Humprey could have won the election is a true metaphysical possibility claim,
and not merely a true conceptual possibility claim?
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self, either... the thought’s being first-personal doesn’t guaran-
tee that it is about me, the thinker... Perhaps the anticipation
that I will wake up in the future can be similarly first-personal
about a future subject who may or may not be identical with
me. (Velleman, 1996, 41)
To connect Velleman’s point with our discussion, consider the first-
personally presented fission case. Suppose I imagine being the initial pre-
fission person, and then waking up as one of the post-fission ‘branches’. I
take it that Velleman’s insight, when applied to this case, is that when I
imagine waking up after the fission procedure has been carried out, there
is, as it were, no guarantee that the person I imagined being prior to the
experiment is the same person as the person I’ve imagined being after the
experiment, i.e. there is no guarantee that these are two stages of the same
person. For if I can imagine being someone else, then surely I can imagine
being the initial pre-fission person and then imagine being one of the post-
fission branches, even if those two person stages are not two stages of a
single person.
But one is inclined to object: when you imagine the first-personally
described fission case, you don’t first imagine being the initial pre-fission
person and then, in a second act of imagining, imagine being one of the
post-fission branches; rather, you simply imagine, in a single imaginative
act, being the initial person and then waking up as one of the branches.
You imagine surviving as one of the branches. I agree with the objection,
but I think the basic point still stands. There is not, I think, a strict
argument from the fact that I can imagine being someone else to the claim
that I can imagine being one person at one time and then being another at
a later time. But the fact that I can do the former suggests that I should
be able to do the latter: it’s plausible to think that the two abilities go
together.
4.5.2 Fission
How does Velleman’s point help with our puzzle? Consider this diagram-
matic presentation of the fission case, where Primo is the stage of the initial
person who undergoes fission, and Lefty and Righty are the two post-fission
person stages that result:24
24Like Lefty and Righty, Primo is not a name but an abbreviation for a definite
description: the initial person who undergoes fission.
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When we imagine the fission case impersonally, we judge that neither Primo
and Lefty nor Primo and Righty are stages of the same person. But when
we imagine the case from the first-person perspective, we imagine, for ex-
ample, first being Primo and then being Lefty, even though Primo and
Lefty are distinct persons.
On this interpretation, then, the fission diagram represents the objective
scenario that one imagines when one imagines the case from the third-
person perspective. And it is this same scenario one imagines when one
imagines the case from the first-person perspective. When one looks at the
case from the first-person perspective, one can imagine traveling along one
of the ‘paths’ represented in the diagram, either from Primo to Lefty or
from Primo to Righty. One can imagine traveling along as a space-time
worm composed of two person stages which do not constitute a person. But
the path one travels along is genuinely contained in the same objective
scenario that one imagines when one imagines the case from the third-
person perspective.
Given a four-dimensionalist metaphysic of persistence, there is an ag-
gregate object composed of Primo and Lefty and an aggregate object com-
posed of Primo and Righty.25 Call these aggregates Primo + Lefty and
Primo + Righty respectively. Given the existence of Primo + Lefty, it is
tempting to suppose that when I imagine surviving fission as Lefty, I am
imagining being Primo + Lefty—I am imagining being an aggregate of per-
son stages which does not constitute a person. Similarly, when I imagine
surviving as Righty, I’m imagining being Primo + Righty. Let’s set these
claims out as follows:
(13) a. When I imagine from the inside surviving fission as Lefty, I am
imagining being Primo + Lefty.
b. When I imagine from the inside surviving fission as Righty, I am
imagining being Primo + Righty.
25Not everyone will accept the existence of these aggregate objects. I discuss this
matter in §4.5.4.
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Now I think we have the materials to solve the puzzle about Supervenience,
at least as it concerns the fission case.
The problem, recall, is this: when we look from the outside, Superve-
nience seems true; but when we look from the inside, Supervenience seems
false. But let’s look more closely at why Supervenience seems false when
we look from the inside. It seems false because there seem to be multiple
‘person possibilities’ consistent with the same continuity facts. There are
at least two possibilities:
(14) a. I could undergo fission and survive as Lefty.
b. I could undergo fission and survive as Righty.
(There’s also a third possibility: I undergo fission and don’t survive. We
leave this aside for the sake of brevity, since the above two possibilities are
enough to generate an apparent problem for Supervenience.) If we make two
assumptions, then the joint truth of (14a) and (14b) is indeed incompatible
with Supervenience. The first assumption is that I am essentially a person—
there is no possible world in which I am not a person. The second is that
these possibility claims must be analyzed in terms of quantification over
possible worlds.
Now consider what it would take for both (14a) and (14b) to be true,
given those two assumptions: there would have to be possible worlds, w
and w′, such that in w, I undergo fission and survive as Lefty, but in w′,
I undergo fission and survive as Righty. So consider x, a pre-fission stage
of me in w, and y, a post-fission stage of Lefty in w. Consider also x′, a
pre-fission stage of me in w′, and y′, a post-fission stage of Lefty in w′.
Note that x and y in w and x′ and y′ in w′ are exactly the same with
respect to continuity. Now note two things: First, x and y are related by
the relation of personal identity in w, since I end up as Lefty in w, and (by
assumption) I am a person in w. Second, x′ and y′ are not related by the
relation of personal identity in w′, since I end up as Righty, not as Lefty, in
w′, and (by assumption) I am a person in w′. Thus, we have an apparent
counterexample to Supervenience.
It should be clear where this line of reasoning breaks down, according
to our approach. The problem is with the assumption that these possi-
bility claims should be analyzed in terms of quantification over possible
worlds. Since these possibilities are seen from the inside, they are centered
possibilities; claims (14a) and (14b) should thus be analyzed in terms of
quantification over centered worlds. Given our claim that when I imag-
ine surviving as Lefty, I’m imagining being Primo + Lefty, and that when
99
Imagination, Content, and the Self
I imagine surviving as Righty, I’m imagining being Primo + Righty, we
ought to analyze (14a) and (14b), respectively, as (15a) and (15b):
(15) a. There is a centered world 〈w, x〉 accessible from 〈actual world, me〉
such that Primo undergoes fission in w, and x is Primo + Lefty
in w.
b. There is a centered world 〈w, x〉 accessible from 〈actual world, me〉
such that Primo undergoes fission in w, and x is Primo + Righty
in w.
But this means that our judgments about the first-personally presented
fission case pose no threat to Supervenience. For if (14a) and (14b) are
to be analyzed, respectively, as (15a) and (15b), then clearly the joint
truth of (14a) and (14b) does not require the existence of two pairs of
possible person stages which are the same continuity-wise but which differ
person-wise. Instead, the conjunction of those two claims requires only
the existence of two accessible centered worlds, one of which is centered on
something that ends up with the original left hemisphere, the other which is
centered on something which ends up with original right hemisphere. And
the existence of two such accessible centered worlds is perfectly compatible
with the truth of Supervenience.
What about the first assumption mentioned above: that I am essen-
tially a person? We glossed this as the claim that there is no possible
world in which I am not a person. Given that gloss on essentially, then
it is true to say that I am essentially a person—at least, nothing I want
to say conflicts with that claim. But now that we have two notions of
metaphysical possibility, there is another way of understanding the claim
that I am essentially a person—namely, that no centered world accessible
from me is centered on a non-person. And this, according to our approach,
is false. Primo + Lefty, for example, is not a person, and yet I could have
been him; thus, a centered world centered on that non-person is accessible
from me. That some non-person aggregates of person stages are possible
ways for me to be is the result of combining Velleman’s observation – I can
imagine being one person and then another – with the idea that imagining
from the inside is a guide to centered possibility.
4.5.3 Williams’s puzzle
A similar solution to Williams’s puzzle can be given. Imagining Williams’s
case from the outside seems to support Supervenience, since only one per-
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son possibility seems compatible with the continuity facts: the two initial
persons switch bodies. But when I imagine this case from the inside, I can
imagine being preA and ending up as either postA (second presentation) or
postB (third presentation).26 Thus, I see two possibilities for my survival,
both of which are consistent with the same continuity facts. This leads me
to endorse two possibility claims:
(16) a. I could start out as preA in a Williams case, and end up as postA.
b. I could start out as preA in a Williams case, and end up as postB.
(Again, there is a third possibility – I could be preA and not survive –
which we ignore for the sake of ease.) Again, the problem arises against
the background of two assumptions: that the possibility claims in (16)
should be analyzed in terms of possible worlds, and that I am essentially
a person.
Given those assumptions, the conjunction of (16a) and (16b) poses a
threat to Supervenience. For the truth of (16a) requires there to be a world
w in which my initial pre-procedure stage preA is person-related to postA,
while the truth of (16b) will require there to be a world w′ in which my
initial pre-procedure stage preA is not person-related to postA (for in w′,
I end up as postB). So even though preA and postA in w and preA and
postA in w′ are the same continuity-wise, they are not the same person-
wise—in w, they are stages of the same person, whereas in w′, they are
not. And this conflicts with Supervenience.
The resolution is as before—we reject the assumption that the possibil-
ity claims in (16) are uncentered possibility claims, since what we see from
the inside are centered possibilities. And we assume that when I imagine
ending up as postA, I am imagining being an aggregate of person stages
that does not constitute a person, namely preA+ postA (this is the Velle-
man point, applied to Williams’s case). And when I imagine ending up as
postB, I am imagining being preA+ postB, an aggregate of person stages
that happens to be a person.
Thus, (16a) and (16b) should be analyzed as (17a) and (17b) respec-
tively:
(17) a. There is a centered world 〈w, x〉 accessible from 〈actual world, me〉
such that x is preA+ postA in a Williams case in w.
26Recall our abbreviations: preA is the person in the A-body prior to procedure, postA
the person in the A-body after the procedure; ‘preB’ and ‘postB’ are defined similarly.
(Imagine again that the bodies have large scarlet letters painted on them.)
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b. There is a centered world 〈w, x〉 accessible from 〈actual world, me〉
such that x is preA+ postB in a Williams case in w.
On this interpretation, the conjunction of (16a) and (16b) does not require
the existence of two pairs of possible person stages which are the same
continuity-wise, but differ person-wise. Again, the conjunction of those
two claims requires only the existence of two accessible centered worlds,
which are centered on different sorts of aggregates of person stages. One is
centered on preA+ postA, a ‘body’ aggregate (i.e. an aggregate of person
stages that is maximally interrelated by the relation of bodily continuity)
that is not a ‘psychological’ aggregate (i.e. an aggregate of person stages
that is maximally interrelated by the relation of psychological continuity);
the other is centered on preA+ postB, a ‘psychological’ aggregate that is
not a ‘body’ aggregate. But the existence of these two accessible centered
worlds in no way threatens Supervenience.
4.5.4 Three-dimensionalism
That’s my solution to the puzzle. Before going on to discuss how this bears
on the Simple-Complex dispute, I want to return to an issue I discussed
briefly at the outset: the dispute between three-dimensionalism and four-
dimensionalism.
Throughout this discussion, we have used the four-dimensionalist’s lan-
guage of person stages and aggregates. Indeed, we framed the central de-
bate as one over Supervenience, which we stated in the language of person
stages. But, of course, three-dimensionalists will not accept this talk of
person stages at face value. Fortunately, there is a way of interpreting
Supervenience that should be acceptable to three-dimensionalists. Suppose
we accept the idea that, for each person x, there is an event which is the
life history of x (cf. Perry, 1975, Introduction). A life history for x can be
thought of as a series of ‘total states’ of x, one state for each moment at
which x exists. Then three-dimensionalists can understand a ‘person stage’
as a total state of a person at a time, and they can understand Superve-
nience not as a claim about persons but as a claim about life histories. On
this interpretation, Supervenience says that fixing the continuity relations
between a total person state x at time t and a total person state y at a
distinct time t′ suffices to determine whether x and y are two parts of the
life history of a single person.27
27For more on how three-dimensionalists should understand supervenience theses con-
cerning persistence, see Zimmerman (1998) and Sider (1999).
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This shows we can frame the debate in terms acceptable to
three-dimensionalists. But can three-dimensionalists accept our solution to
the puzzle? Some three-dimensionalists certainly can: our solution should
be acceptable to three-dimensionalists who endorse what Sider (2001a) calls
promiscuous endurantism.28 Promiscuous endurantism says that:
...in the vicinity of every person [there is] a plurality of coinci-
dent entities, which share the same momentary properties but
differ in their persistence conditions. In my vicinity, there is
a psychological-person, a body-person, and perhaps other enti-
ties corresponding to other criteria of personal identity. (Sider,
2001a)
To see that our solution is available to the promiscuous endurantist,
let’s look at our treatment of the fission case. One of the crucial moves
we made was to say that, when I look at the fission case from the inside, I
see multiple centered possibilities: one centered on Primo + Lefty and one
centered on Primo + Righty. The four-dimensionalist understands these
objects to be aggregates of persons. But the promiscuous endurantist can
understand Primo + Lefty as follows: if Primo begins to exist at t1, fission
occurs at t2, and Lefty ceases to exist as t3, then Primo + Lefty picks out
an enduring object that is wholly spatially coincident with Primo from t1
to t2, and then is wholly spatially coincident with Lefty from t2 to t3, at
which time it too ceases to exist. The promiscuous endurantist can say
something similar about Primo + Righty. Note that these objects, Primo
+ Lefty and Primo + Righty, correspond to Lewis’s (1976) branching psy-
chological criterion of personal identity, and so the promiscuous endurantist
will accept their existence.
But not every endurantist is promiscuous; some are chaste. Sider
(2001a) defines chaste endurantism as three-dimensionalism plus the claim
that person-like entities never wholly spatially coincide.29 The chaste en-
durantist does not believe that there are any objects like Primo + Lefty
or Primo + Righty, as understood by either the four-dimensionalist or the
promiscuous endurantist. Thus, the chaste endurantist will not be able to
help herself to centered worlds centered on Primo + Lefty and Primo +
28Thanks to Caspar Hare for helping me to see this point.
29Olson (1997) seems to endorse something like chaste endurantism. Promiscuity and
chastity do not exhaust endurantist’s options, of course. Whether our solution to the
puzzle is compatible with a given intermediate endurantist position will depend on the
precise details of that position.
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Righty, for on her view there are no such centered worlds since the relevant
‘centers’ do not exist. So it seems that our solution – at least in its present
formulation – is not available to the chaste endurantist.
So while our solution is independent of a specific view of how things
persist, it is not independent of a specific view of what there is. We require
a suitably generous ontology. That said, there may be a way to use our
framework of centered/uncentered imagination and possibility to fashion a
solution to the puzzle that would be acceptable to the chaste endurantist.
But I leave that as a matter for future inquiry.30
4.6 Something like the Simple View
Recall the Velleman point: when one imagines personal identity cases from
the inside, there is no guarantee that the person one imagines starting
out as at the beginning of the case is the same person as the person one
imagines ending up as at the end of the case. What this suggests is that
what I can imagine surviving from the inside is no guide to what sort of
vicissitudes a person can survive. In other words, first-personal intuitions
about what I could survive are not intuitions about personal identity at
all; rather they are intuitions that concern possible ways for me to be.
If this is right, then it appears to vindicate the Complex View: since
our third-person intuitions favor Supervenience, and since our first-person
intuitions simply don’t bear on the truth of Supervenience, we ought to
accept the Complex View. But even though we have to reject the letter
of the Simple View, our account nevertheless vindicates the basic thought
that motivates it. According to our account, it is true that, in a given
possible situation, who I will be in the future is not settled by the conti-
nuity relations I bear to future person stages. So there is a sense in which
something like the Simple View is true.
We characterized the Simple View as the denial of a supervenience
thesis, so it would be nice to characterize our something-like-the-Simple-
30One possibility is that we represent centered possibilities not using centered worlds,
but by using pairs of a world w and a function f from times to individuals in w. Here
〈w, f〉 represents the possibility that, for each time t for which f is defined, I am f(t) at
t in w. So if it’s possible for me to be Primo at t1, and then Lefty at t2, then there is a
〈w, f〉 accessible from me where w is a world in which fission occurs, and f is the function
{〈t1, Primo〉, 〈t2, Lefty〉}. This proposal doesn’t require there to be objects like Primo
+ Lefty. But on this proposal, we cannot ask which individual I am in the centered
possibility 〈w, f〉, but only which individual I am at such-and-such a time. Something
like this might work, though one would need to think through the details carefully.
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View-view in a similar fashion. But what would the relevant supervenience
thesis be? Given that supervenience is a philosophical term of art, it’s not
clear that what we’re going to formulate really counts as a supervenience
thesis. Since the intuitive idea behind supervenience is that fixing one set
of facts fixes another set of facts, let’s call the relevant thesis a fixity thesis.
Our fixity thesis should say something like this: Fix who I am at a given
time t in a possible situation. That is, fix that, at t, I am person stage xt
(I am some aggregate x whose temporal part at t is xt). Then fix all the
continuity relations that xt bears to every other person stage y in w. Then
you’ve fixed whether or not y is a temporal part of x (i.e. me) or not. Here
is the precise formulation:
Fixity
For all centered worlds 〈w, t, x〉, 〈w′, t′, x′〉 accessible from 〈actual
world, now, me〉 and person stages y in w and y′ in w′: if xt
and y in w and x′t′ and y′ in w′ are the same with respect to
continuity, then y is a part of x in w just in case y′ is part of
x′ in w′.
Note that here we use the ‘official’ notion of a centered world, a world-time-
individual triple, rather than simply a world-individual pair (see footnote
3 in §1.1).
If Fixity were true, then once you fixed who I was in a given centered
situation at a time t, and fixed the relations of continuity between me-at-t
and every other person stage, then you would have determined who I would
be in the future (and who I had been in the past). But Fixity is not true,
at least not if we take our first-person intuitions at face value. For Fixity
is undermined by the judgments we arrive at when we consider fission and
Williams’s puzzle from the inside.
Take fission. I can imagine surviving fission as Lefty or as Righty. So
there are two centered situations or predicaments I could be in, a Primo-
Lefty predicament and a Primo-Righty predicament (a predicament is rep-
resented by a set of centered worlds). To get a counterexample to Fixity,
consider two centered worlds accessible from me, 〈w, t, x〉 in the Primo-
Lefty predicament, 〈w′, t′, x′〉 in the Primo-Righty predicament. Take xt
to be Primo in w, and x′t′ to be Primo in w′. And take y to be Lefty in
w, and y′ to be Lefty in w′. xt and y in w and x′t′ and y′ in w′ are the
same with respect to continuity. In the Primo-Lefty predicament, I end up
as Lefty. So y, i.e. Lefty, is a part of x in w, since x is Primo + Lefty in
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w. But in the Primo-Righty predicament, I end up as Righty. So y′, i.e.
Lefty, is not a part of x′ in w′, since x′ is Primo + Righty in w′.
Take the second and third presentations of Williams’s case. In the
second presentation, I start out as preA and end up as postA, while in
the third presentation, I start out as preA and end up as postB. We get
another counterexample to Fixity by considering two centered worlds acces-
sible from me, 〈w, t, x〉 in the first predicament, 〈w′, t′, x′〉 in the second.
Take xt to be preA in w, and x′t′ to be preA in w′. And take y to be postA
in w, and y′ to be postA in w′. Again, xt and y in w and x′t′ and y′ in w′
are the same with respect to continuity. But y, i.e. postA, is part of x in
w, since x is preA+ postA in w. But y′, i.e. postA, is not part of x′ in w′,
since x′ is preA+ postB in w′.
Does personal identity supervene on continuity? Yes, for Supervenience is
true. Is the question of who I will be, or who I have been, settled by which
continuity relations I bear to other person stages? No, for Fixity is false.
So the Simple View is wrong, but it gets something right. As friends of the
Simple View have insisted, there is an important sense in which who I will
be, or who I have been, is not settled by what continuity relations I bear to
other person stages. But when properly understood this thought supports
the denial of Fixity rather than the denial of Supervenience. And denying
Fixity, it should be clear, is compatible with accepting the Complex View,
since Fixity simply says nothing about what it takes for two person stages
to be stages of the same person. Once we are clear about the nature of
first-personal intuitions about persistence, we see that the ‘simplicity of
the self’ is compatible with the complexity of persons.
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Semantics for centered possibility
This appendix sketches a semantics for the sort of centered possibility
claims discussed in Chapter 4. Consider the following centered possibil-
ity claims:
(18) a. I could have been Fred.
b. Dilip could have been Fred.
We want a theory that will yield the following truth conditions:
(19) a. JI could have been FredKc,i,g = 1 iff there is a 〈w, x〉 accessible
from 〈wi, xc〉 such that x is Fred in w.
b. JDilip could have been FredKc,i,g = 1 iff there is a 〈w, x〉 accessible
from 〈wi, Dilip〉 such that x is Fred in w.
What would the semantics for the modal need to look like in order
for us to derive (19a) and (19b)? I will focus on (19b). On the standard
account of the semantics of modals found in Kratzer (1981, 1991), modals
take as an argument a contextually supplied set of possible worlds called
the modal base. The modal then quantifies over the worlds in that base,
saying that the embedded sentence is true at one world in the base (if the
modal is a possibility modal) or that it is true at every world in the base (if
the modal is a necessity modal). One way to implement Kratzer’s proposal
is to assume that a modal always combines with a covert variable which
is assigned a set of worlds by the variable assignment. So a schematic
Kratzer-inspired entry for such a covert variable might look like this:
JB1Kc,i,g = g(B1) = {w : w is accessible from wi}
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Since we now require modals to quantify over centered worlds, we can
re-construe modal bases as sets of centered worlds. What we want is for
the modal in (19b) to quantify over the following set of centered worlds:
{〈w, x〉 : 〈w, x〉 is accessible from 〈wi, Dilip〉}
One way to get this result is to make JB1Kc,i,g not a set of centered worlds,
but rather a function from an individual to a set of centered worlds:JB1Kc,i,g would take an individual y to the set centered worlds accessible
from 〈wi, y〉. We could then feed that function the individual denoted by
Dilip. The possibility modal would then quantify over the centered worlds
accessible from 〈wi, Dilip〉, and say that at least one of those centered
worlds 〈w, x〉 is such that x is Fred in w, which is exactly what we want.
The suggestion requires making sure that, in the LF of (18b), JB1Kc,i,g
takes Dilip as an argument. This can be accomplished using the same
sort of res movement posited by the theories of de re attitude ascription
discussed in §2.6. When ‘Dilip’ moves, it leaves behind a trace, ‘t2’, which
is bound by a λ-binder occurring at the top of the complement clause. Here
is the lexical entry for ‘B1’ on this account, followed by a specification of
the proposed structure for (18b):
JB1Kc,i,g = λye.{〈w, x〉 : 〈w, x〉 is accessible from 〈wi, y〉}
Possibly [B1 Dilip ][λ2 t2 is Fred]
Given this structure and the assumed lexical entry, we get the following
truth condition:
JPossiblyKc,i,g(JB1Kc,i,g(JDilipKc,i,g))(λw.Jλ2 t2 is FredKc,w,g) = 1 iffJPossiblyKc,i,g({〈w, x〉 : 〈w, x〉 is accessible from 〈wi,Dilip〉})(λw.Jλ2 t2
is FredKc,w,g) = 1 iff
There is a 〈w′, x′〉 accessible from 〈wi, Dilip〉 such that [λw.λx.x is
Fred](w′)(x′) = 1 iff
There is a 〈w′, x′〉 that is accessible from 〈wi, Dilip〉 such that x′ is
Fred in w′.
This is the desired result.1
1This semantics might also be useful for making sense of de re epistemic modal claims
like I might be Rudolph Lingens and That guy might be Ortcutt.
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